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CHAPTER I 
IN'rRODuCTION 
In 1922, there began at the University of Vienna 
a seminar led by the physicist-philosopher Professor Moritz 
Sohliok. The membership of this seminar group was .. in large 
measure, composed of Uamateur ll philosophers. They were men 
whose main or original specializ9.tion 1l1Y in other fields 
ot knowledge. The original members included, to mention 
a few, Victor Kratt, historian; H~ns Hahn, mathematician; 
Pelix Kaufmann, lawyer; Otto Neurath .. sociologist; Kurt 
Reidemeister, mathematician. And among the numerous visitors 
who swelled their re.nks were such men as the Prague physic-
ist, Philipp Prank, and Alfred J. AyeI' of Oxford. 
These meetings quickly came to lire in 1926 with 
the arrival of Rudolf Carnap. His Logische Autbau der Welt 
-..---
and also Ludwig Wittgensteln's Tractatu~ Logioo-Philosophicus 
were full and precise stntements of the early philosophizing 
of this group s.nd the basis of long discussions. Out of 
these two works came the first reRl philosophical position 
of Logical Positivism. 
During the course of these meetings, it was sug-
gested that a name be adopted for the group in order to lend 
a pleasant aspect to their purposes and to connect them with 
1 
2 
the quiet uni ver'si ty life of old Viennl!l. The name adopted ac-
complished all this and even more, when the nucleus o.f this new 
movement became known as the "Vienna Circle. 1t Thus 1n the 
borderland of German idealistic influence emerged this modern 
form of empiricism. 
In 1936, however, the meetings ended rather abruptly 
with the assassination o.f Professor Schliak by a former student. 
But the new philosophy, which had its beginning here, did not 
end with the Vienna Circle. Other movements, in Europe and 
America, followed; and the philosophy of Logical Positivism, 
with its great attraction for men of science, continued to grow 
with the soientific spirit of the age. 
Perhaps nowhere today has the positivist movement gain-
ed greater momentum thl!ln in the United states. This is due, in 
part, to our own philosophical backtround and, in part, to the 
anti-CUltural and anti-Semitio policies of Nazism which caused 
the emigration of s.ver~l of the leading .figures in the movement 
to th1s country. Among the group were Rudolt Carnap, Hans 
Reichenback, Philipp 1,lrank, Richard von Mises, Hervert Peigl, 
Carl Hempel. 11'1'1e influence of these men has indeed been wide, 
ste~~ing, as it does, from many of our major Universities -
Chicago, California, Harvard, Minnesota, and in some measure 
from Princeton. 
3 
Logical Positivism, however, is not something entirely 
new in the history of thought. Insistence on experience and the 
experimental tria.l r-lnd error method has characterized many a. 
philosophical position. In antiquity, we find the Sophists, 
stoics and Equicureans; in the Middle Ages, the Nominalists. 
Modern times has witnessed a greater development of this line 
ot thought, with Baoon, Hobbes, Locke, lIume, Bentham, J. S. Mill, 
and Spencer in England and, in France, 'D'Alembert, Saint-Simon, 
Cornte, and Poincare. 
Of this group, David Hume seems to have played the 
most significa.nt role in the genesis of modern positivism. At 
least two conclusions ot his empirical hypotheses bear close 
resemblance to common positivist tenets, namely, that the sphere 
of deductive reasoning is closed to st~te!pent4; about matters of 
fact and, secondly, the factual statements can ultimately be re-
• 
duced to statements concerned solely with sense experience. 
Auguste Comte, although of the Ifpositive" family, does 
not bea.r the close ties of kinship to the modern movement that 
one might suspect. Any trans-empirical philosophy, for Corete, 
had simply outlived its usefulness. Consequently, the only 
ttpositive" sciences \-lere mathematics, astronomy, physiCS, 
chemistry, biology, and sociology. There is a. gap between these 
six be.sic sciences, however, which eliminates the possibility 
of 11 "unity of science." Since the LogiCAl Positivist insists 
4 
that ~ scientific stqtements can be reduced to stp,tementa of 
sensations, it appel"!,rs that he is closer to British empiric!)l 
thought than the French materialist speculation. 
The United states, too, has had III history of empiric-
ism. Positivism found rich gro~d tor growth in the soil tilled 
by pragmatism, instrumentalism, and operationalism. The writings 
01.' Charles S. Peirce and especially his essay, "How to Make Our 
Ideas Clear," gave great impetus to the philosophic movement 01.' 
pra.gmatism in, this country. The meaning 01.' a stl)tement, Peirce 
wrote, consists in the sum 01.' its verifiable consequences. There 
could be no difference in meaning that did not ~ a difference 
in practice. l Peirce, moreover, like the contemporary :British 
philosopher and SCientist, Bertrand Russell, combined this 
attr~ction tor the empirical with.9. deep interest in symbolio 
logic - a combination that is the hall-m~rk of logical positivis 
• 
Peirce fa close friend, William James, continued to 
cievelop the philosophy of pragmatism. In his Pra.gmatism, James 
stresses continuA.lly the relationship of a term's meaning to its 
"Cash value in experiential terms. n2 A atatement has meaning, 
1 ChRrles S. Peirce, "How To l-1o.ke Our Ideas Clear, If 
Collected P2e!'s, I, Principles 2!. Ph110S0l?~' eds. Hartshorne 
and WeIss, rvard University Press, 19j1, 0, 402~ (numbers 
refer to paragraph numbers) 
2 William James, PragmatiSM, New York, 1912, 53, 200. 
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then, if it has experiential consequenoes and these oonsequenoes 
oonstitute the very meaning of the st9tement. (rhe truth of an 
idea, oonsequently, is a prooess, "the process namely of its 
verifying itself, its veri-fication."3 
Other pragmatio theories followed that of James, the 
instrumentalism of Dewey and the operationalism of Bridgeman, 
all of which tied American philosophioal thought more olosely 
to the empirioal. 
How then may we describe the philosophy of contemporary 
logical positivism? John Laird's desoription is amusing but 
nevertheless, ~U$: 
By positiVism in its most general sense we mean the theory 
that if you '!>vant to Imow anything about anything, you must 
either make an a.ppointment with Olle of the soiences or 
else be content to be oheated. Outside the soiences there 
1s no information. The poets may beguile you or exalt you 
but they cannot tell you anything. Theologians maY' be-
wilder you, philosophers may rack you and rhetoriciaps may 
soothe you. But none of them oan tell you any thing. 4 
The positivist, to stress the obvious, is A man completely de-
voted to science and the scientifio method. History, he will 
argue, speaks for itself. For nearly two thousand years, from 
the time of Aristotle, progress qnd discovery in science 
3 Ibid., 201. (For present pur'poses we omi t q con-
s1der~tion o~mes' second criterion of meanings and truth, 
developed in his theory of the "will to believe. tI ) 
4 Jolm Laird, "Posi ti vism, EmpiriCism Rnd Metaphysics, II 
Prooeedings .2!. 1h!. Aristotelian Sooiety, XXXIX, 1938-19.39, 240. 
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was re1a.ti vely slow a.nd smql1. Then in the 16th century some-
thing momentous happened. Success becAme the ox'der of the day, 
achievements multiplied, advances were mnde by leaps and bounds. 
The nnmes of Copernicus (11*,72 - 1.543), FN1IlCis Bacon (1561 -
1642>, Kepler (1571 - 1630), and Newton (1642 - 1727), date the 
beginnings of the rich harvest of science. 
In the centuries that f'ollol1ed, man was relieved of 
many of the burdens formerly imposed by space and time. Medicine 
has prolonged his lifo and lessened his sufferings. Mechanics 
andcheroistry have given man a relJ:ltive mastery over space and 
time with the locomotive, the auto, the aeroplane. Electricity 
has given us the light ~nd force a highly productive civilization 
needs; it has made possible new and more efficient media of 
communication. And on the dawn of the atomic age, there seems 
no end to what science can accomplish. 
Because of ttds rica fruitfulness of sci ence, the 
pOSitivist conc1:udos thl3t scientific methods be required of ill 
fields of human knowledge_ In particular, philosophy must 
disengage itself from the sterile speculation ot the past and 
must proceed along scientific lines. In short, the quite valid 
methodology of one discipline is quite invalidly demanded of all 
disciplines. 
As the name ilLogical Positivism" would imply, attention 
to mathematics and logic And emph~sis on the linguistic aspects 
1 
of tra.di tional ph11osophicq.l problems appeA.r '1 s indelible lll~rks 
dist:t!'l(}lishing logic"'l positivists f'rom the early empiricists. 
Positivism systematically qpproaches the problem of moaning by 
menns of ~_ logicnl :1nalysis of language in distinctiontio the 
earlier, more psychologically orient~ted forms of Empiricism, 
Positivism, and Pragmatism.5 This is tho lOGic, ot logical 
positivism. 
Thus the coupling of' sense pe'rception and logic is 
who.t differentiates posi ti vism from the older empiricism. As 
Victor Kraft argues, the positivists have combined the insight 
into the !. :e.riori na ture of logic and );)athematics "Hi th the 
empiricist tenet of va.lidation by experience alone. 6 Previously, 
Kraf't continues, most of the philosophers who recognized this 
~ priori nature were apriorists even with regprd to knowledge of 
reality. Empiricists, on the other hand, failed to see this 
~ Erior!, nAture of logioqnd mathematics, holding tho.t all 
knowledge ~nd scienoe is derived trom experience as the sole 
ground of validity. The tfVienna Circle" restricted the 
empiricist thesis to factual knowledge. All factual knowledge" 
tbey ma.intnined, is der! ved frOII] experience and can be validated 
by experience elone. The core ot empiricism was thereby 
5 Herbert Feigl" "Logical Empiricism, It Twentieth 
Oentury Ph1l0S0Ph,: Livinr. Schools .2!. Thought, ed. Runes, 
New York. 1943, j 7. 
6 Victor Kraft, The Vienna. Circle, Newtork, 1953,23-
8 
perserved. Though recognizing the !. Eriori v8.lidi ty of logic 
Bnd mathem~tics, the e~rly positivists did not veor toward some 
type of r'';1.tiormlism irrith respect to factual knovl1edge since nei'!" 
ther logic nor m8themqtics mAke ony factual assertions at all. 
This last notion of' non-facturl assertions (which the 
positivist CAlls tAutologies or analytic stntemonts) requires 
greator developroAnt, as it is essential for an understanding of 
philosophic positivism. Long oe1'oI'8 the Vienna Circle began its 
discussion~, Inm19nuel Kent had focused attention on one importqnt 
noetic fact .which no succeeding philosopher could seriously deny. 
Kant saw clearly th,.,t the a('~uisition of empirical aata "lQuld not 
be true hum!:'ln knowledge until it had taken on the forms of the 
categories. In other t-lor'ds, a perception of an existing other 
could not be rendered meRni:r)i:~ful unless subsumed under some 
class or concept. Sheer empiricism, consequently, is imposstble. 
In this sense Kant 1a famous dictum is not altogether erroneof1s, 
f 
na.mely, thAt percept! on without conoepts is b:tind ~uld conce~ts 
'Vlithout perception are empty. 
For Kqnt, however, there is ~ structural necessicy to 
think according to d efini te forms or categories. Kantian 
philosophy, as a consequence, petrified notions of Newtonian 
physics in its explanation of the space-time category. 
Positivists were fully conscious of this deficiency and 
endeavored to formulqte R doctrine which would leave room for the 
evolution of science. 
9 
Two philosopher-scientists, Ernst Mach And Henri 
POincare, disputed n solution to this o.if'flcu1ty. Tho question 
before them was, in essence: whAt are class notions? Considering 
the problem on the scientific level, they a~kerl: what are the 
general prinCiples of science? According to Mach, they are 
abbreviated economic!:1l descriptiJns of observed tacts; according 
to Poincare, they are 1'ree creations of the human mind which do 
not tell any-thing about observed racts. 7 An attempt to 
integrate the two concepts into one coherent system led to the 
development ot logical positivism. For the positivist 911 class 
.' 
concepts and generqlizations are pure constructions of the mind. 
Tney are neither reql and objective nor !. priori determinations 
of the mind, but merely arbitrary convl!)ntions about how to use 
some words or expressions; they function as tools oftha mind 
.. 
to aid in the correlation of' sense data. But such constructions 
may 11aVEI factual import, according to positivists, provi'ded they 
in no way refer to what is, in principle, bAyond sense obser-
vation. In 13::>ief, the ,whole content of the class must be 
empirical. 
This whole positivist scheme offered much more 
possibili ty of synthesis ~nG unity thr.1U the older form of 
7 Phillip f'r~nkJ Modern Science!:lnc. Its FhilosophZ, 
Ca.mbridge (Mass.), 1949, 6-9. - -
10 
empiricism. By adding the device of logic and mathematics, it 
brought about some mf-!nageable control of empirical dat!',\. In 
contrast with pragmatism nnd operationalisM, positivism 
formula ted its criteria 91.' meoning in ~ strictly logical WflY, 
which satisfied tho rigid requirements of a formal science. 
These were, undoubtedly, strong reasons why professional 
scientists and logicians were dr~wn to the philosophy of 
positivism. 
What trion did philosophy become on positivist terms? 
Philosophy could be no more than the mental a cti vi ty of 
classificqtion of ideas. It is 108ico1 analysis, i.e., a 
clarification of tile language used in everyday life. 8 In short 
philosophy became logic. Numerous centers of positivism have 
arisen, all embodying this conception of philosophy: in the 
Uni ted Ste.tes we find the schools of Ce.rnap, Fra.nk, '!!nd. 
Reichenbach, and the Chicago school of Charles ~~. Morrij; in 
mgln.nd, there is the Cambridge school divided into groups 
under fmssell and Wittgenstein, and finally the Oxford school 
of Ali'red Ayer. 
It was Wittgenstein, however, who was the first to 
emphasize that the trqdition~l problems of philosophy were 
nothing but verbal problems. 'fhe school of philosophic method 
8 Gustav Bergm~n, "Logical Positivism," !. History £! 
Ph110sophic.ql Systeuls, ed. I-'ern, J:ie,,; York, 1950, 1.~72. 
11 
under his leadership at Cambridge, crllled "therapeutic 
positivism," maintains th8t philosophy is not a discipline 
aiming at some superior type of knowledge or intellectual 
discovery, but only 8. method of revealing the linguistic 
confusions that gave rise to philosophics.l problems and of 
solving ·th~se problems,simply by showing there were no genuirle 
problems to begin led th. 9 It 1s undoubtedly due in 1a.rge 
measure to tJittgenstein that we find the positivist preoccupation 
with sema,ntics (an analysis of the meaning of terms and expres-
sions) a.nd with syntax (the formal analysis or sentence struc-
ture). 
No matter what the predominant influence, the 
friendly little discussion group cslled the ttVianna Gircla" 
set in motion a new movement of empiricism which spread 
throughout Europe ~nd the United states. 
9 
Positivism, II 
Appraisal of 
April, 1946, 
cr. B. A. Farrell, !IAn Appra,isa1 of Ther'lpeutic 
I, Nind, LV, 21'7, J8.nuary, 1946, 25-48; nAn 
'rhe~utic Posi ti vism, tI II, Mind, LV, 216, 
1.:)3-150. 
CHAPTEH II 
T1fE PHINCIPLl::. e)l" VERIFICATION 
The problem of meaning is undoubtedly the most 
important and most l,-lidely debated topic in positivist 
circles today. For an understanding of tho.positivist's 
stand, m'oreover, his view of meaning is basic, for on it 
depends the sum total of his philosophical tenets and. can .. 
clusions. Since the "principle of verifiability" signifies 
an essential generalization of this view, R. ctr1 tical R.nalysi s 
of the verifiability principle seems the tool most apt for 
evaluating the philosophy of contemporary positivists. 
The positiVists, we noted previously, st8nds in 
awe of the luminous 9.chievements of .tUodel,"n science. As a 
result, he claims thl'it .'!ll questions 01' ff!.ct, of whatever 
branch of krJ.owledge, "ca.n be decided by the empirical methods 
of science alone. So ,,-11 th regArd to the general concept" 
01' meBnina, he infers logically: the meaning of a st:3.tement 
is the metnod of its vSI-ification. '.Phis is the verification 
principle in its simplest form. :,\nether the indi vid<.l.al 
positivist wishes to equate verification ',dth the mea.ning 
of a stntement or simply to make it the test of mfll'~ning, 
will make little difference in practice. His two 0h1et 
problems concern the qu:: stion of me'1ning and the que~jtion 
of verifioation. 'rhe formc~r asks under Hha.t conditions 
12 
13 
a sentence has meaning; the latter, how we discover whether 
a sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes 
tho first and, in R certain sense, there Is only one answer 
to both problems. For, from a positivistts vie¥, to know 
what it YJould be for a sentence to be true is to know its 
mea.ning~ And if the truth-coma tlons be impossible even 
to imagine, the sentence is simply meaningless. 
The same point is brought out in an example by 
Professor\"'aism9nn. Contrasting tne two propositions rtthe 
dog barks il and t'the dog thinks, I' he nqtes that the first 
contains a normal use of words while the secoml contains 
e. use v.1hich is outsiete the boundaries of common speech. 1 
. 
In answering 9 question a.s tor,he mel1ning of t.he proposi-
tion Itthe dog thinks," t'Jaisroann concludes that "explaining 
the verification is explaining the me"'ning, '"nd ch.!:Inging 
the ... i 1 ch i ' vr:)!·ii'-lC."' .. tion."2 mann ng s f-?ng ng C.ne _ ... <"- In thi s s eIlae , 
then, meaning wO!lla seem to be Identical with veri1'ic~tion. 
There is a further notion, however, which is 
essentiaL for a.n understonding: of the verification principle. 
Bertrand Russell has objected th~.t, accQrding to this 
1 F. l'ialsmann,"Symposium: Verifiabili ty,ll 
Pr5ceedinf~ . .2.! lt2 Aristote11a.p Society, Suppl. XIX, 1945. 
12. 
2 Ibid. 
-
14 
principle, propositions like the follovring pre rendered 
meaningless: "atomic warfare may lead to the exterminR.tiofl 
of lif'e on earthll .9nd athere w~.s ~.t;ime befol:'ecnere Has 
111'19 on earth.") Tills Is not the case since .911 positiv-
iats make P. distinction between practical verifiability 
nnd verifiability in principle" An example f'requentl;y used 
by post ti vi sts C)1.n b est clarify the significance of this 
distinction. 11'ho proposition, t1there Is a mountain 3000 
feet tdgh on the oth0r side of the moon," Appears to be an 
lmverlflable st"tement. No human. being I::a:; eVer repol-.ted 
h.ts observp.tions of the moon I s farther side. 'rhe propos!-
tion, consequentl:r, Hould be menningless. Posi ti vista 
insist, however, thnt verifiability is not a m?tter of the 
physicl'11 possibility of ver'ification, !l1uch less of s.ctual 
verification. Hather, it refers only to the logical pos~ 
sibili ty of observation. 11'0 determine mel'mingfulness, one 
need only to be ~bLe to conceive of t;he observAtions th.":;t 
vl0uld confirm or deny a proposition. 'The st9tement, lI r ivers 
flow uphill,1I may be physicRl1y impossible to verify, yet 
it is logically p033~~le or verifiable in prinoiple qnd 
henoe Ttleaningful. 
) B. R"..lssell, ilLogical l'osi tl vism, l/ Hevue 
.!!l,t.erpati?l1:.a.le ~ Philos0-llil1e, IV, 1950, 9. 
1$ 
According to tho positivist, chen, the vGriric9. 
t10n p:1'lnclp Ie is 9 crt 'Ct:;l'ion 01' cogni ti 'If 13 s:),E:nif1cence 
rnthet' thnn of t!'utl.h It9,nswo:;;'s t:le tluestlon: b~:,j this 
True, accordingly, l'11l::--:ns confirmed by eU1pil~ic" 1 observ':ltion. 
-
of this principla ,'n;'ld,~ 'by posl t1 vi ate V;,,'}mse 1 yes, to d.e-
panl100& of pbJ"losoph1cal 111s it isrtl'1.d.e out to be. :'\U'red 
16 
first clear and full present~tion by en English writer o~ 
common posi ti vist doc trines ~ncl, in n,dai ti on, offers a 
detailed and revised account of the verific):!.tion principle. 
Indeed, l:anguage, 'fruth ~ Logi c seems to be reg9I>ded a,s 
the Ifcatechism ll of modern positivIsm. 
In general terms the verification principle may 
be st~ted as follows: a sentenc~ is factually significant 
if, and only if, some Observations would be rsleva.nt to its 
truth or falsity. Sense exporie~ce alone constitutes factual 
me!1,ningi'ulness. Bssentially, then, posi ti vism 1 s nothing 
but a. modern version of the old theme "empll'>ici&m. tf 
The original, Bnd perhaps most familiar statement 
of the verifIcp,tion principle" "las given by Professor' .t·lo!"itz 
Schlick in thl~ form: lithe mea.ning of n. proposi tiOIl is the 
) 
method of Its verification. "4 In the eyes of Professor' 
• r~'Cl1J ic1{ , this cr:! terion l:~as nu mere hypo'tllesis but simply 
a stAtement of the WRy m~aning is actually Rssignea to 
proposi tions, both in everyday life 3.nu in science.':> These 
views can well be considered embryonic - the first, rudi-
mentary contentions upon which the origin91 logica.l 
4 Moritz Schlick, itMeaning Rnd Verificfltion,11 
Headinss ill PhI1osophicA I Anal;ysis, ads., fi'eigl a.nd Sellars, 
New 'York, 19[it~j. 11+8. 
5 ~. 
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positIvist speculAtions were built. The difficulty t'lith 
Schlick's criterion, as argued by Carnap, Hempel, '"aismann 
and Ayer~ was thr:tt it demq,nded conclusive verifiability as 
a test of me~ning - that is, n proposition Qould be said 
to be mOlllnl:,gfu1. only if its truth could. be conclusively 
established in experience. 
The main reason for tne positivist rejection of 
conclusive vorifiability is tnat it rules out all propositions 
of universal form and thus 911 stqtements expressing general 
la.ws. General propos! tl ens like "all men are mortal I' and 
"all bodies are ex-cended,lf Ayer explains, by nature cover 
an infinite number of cases and no finite series of observa-
tions could possible est~1blish them l-lith cel>t&lnty.6 Con-
sequently, if conclusive v8rif'iabili ty is upheld, proposi-
tions of this sort must be rega,rded as pieces of nonsens.e .. 
But propositions of universal for'm constitute and integral 
part of scientific theories, argues Cqrl deli'lpel, j:)ud he 
therefore rejects SchliJlk fa cri tarion a.s overly restricti ve.,1 
vJaisma.nn is in substa.ntial a.greement with both iiempel and 
6 A. J. Ayer, ,Lqnguage, 'fruth ~ LOSiic, New York, 
1 C~rl He'ropel, ltproblems ane C:.tanges in the 
mpiricist Criterion of l'ieaning,lI I1evu~ +nternationa1e 
~ Philoso:ehie, IX, 1950, 46. 
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AyeI' but adds conclusive verifiabili t;y must be ~bandoned 
not only because of the unlimited number of tests involved 
but also because of the "open texture" of the terms them-
selves, i.e .• , the possibility of some totally new experiences 
or of new discoveries affecting the interpretqtion of 
presently accepted facts. 8 
Professor AyeI' gives still other reasons for the 
rejection of Schlick's criterion. Statements about the past, 
as well as generAl laws, must be judged non-significant on 
this criterion. For, as AyeI' maintains, historical st!:l.te-
ments can never be more than highly probable.9 A more com-
pel ling reason from Ayerts view, however, is that, stlUuld 
conclusive verifiability be demBnded as a criterion of meaning, 
it would be impossible to make Bny significant st."tement 
of fact at all. For, on his showing, no factual statement, 
• 
Whether general or purely ostensive, can possibly be more 
than an empirical hypothesis And hence only probable.10 
8 F. Weismann, "Symposium: Verifisbi li ty, It 
Proceedings 2£ 1h£ Aristotelian Socie~y, Supple XIX, 1945, 
126-127. Rudolf Curnap makes the sam~ argument in his essRy, 
"Time and Teatability~1t Philosophy-£!. SCience" 111,1936, 
425. 
9 A. J. Ayer, L~onguage, Truth .!!!!! LoSic, New York, 
1951, 31. 
10 Ibid., 38, 91. (The question of basic or 
oatenai ve proposi tiona ~nd thf.l t of probRobi li ty \vil1 be 
treated in chapter IV.) 
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Thus Professor Schliok's criterion has been 
abandoned by all present-day positivists. But the 8.rguments 
traced above bring to light the definite relative notion 
thRt vii 11 be cont!'lined. in any new cri tarion of meaning. 
As pragm~tists assert, there can be no absolute truth for 
the future rrJay always chllnge things. In like manner, 
positivists reject the very notion of "absolute,t! since t.hey 
can admit only a relAtive confirmation, to a greeter or less 
degree, of any factual st""tement whatever. Indeed, Neurath 
Ilnd Popper have argued for tIle substitution of confirmed 
and unconfirmed in place of true a.nd false. ll Ca.rnap, too. 
- ----
has spoken against the notion of absolute, suggesting tha.t 
the i':1Rthema.tica.l laws of probability repla.ce conventional 
trath-va.lues. 12 The absolute for a positivist is simply 
non-sensicnl. 
In view of these difficulties connected with com-
plete verii'iability, Karl Popper advanced a substitute 
criterion \vhich he termed complete falsifiability.13 A 
11 Victor Kraft, ~ Vienna Circle, New York, 
1953, 1119. 
12 Rudolf Carnap. Logical Foundations 2! 
Probability, Chicago, 1950, 177. 
13 Karl Popper, Logik ~ Forschung, Vienna, 
1935, 13. 
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sentence would be factually significant, according to this 
. 
criterion, if, and only if, it can be definitely confuted 
by experience. In the first place, all positivists today 
will not allow tnrlt the vast majority of factual pr'oposi-
tions CRn be conclusively confuted any more than they will 
allow conclusive verification. But even should Popperts 
supposition be granted, difficulties remain. In establish-
ing any proposition of universal fo::-m, h9w could one ever 
stop a process of falsifiability? If I have performed ~ 
number of tests, where !l be taken as any number, and these 
tests have all verified the proposition in question, why 
could not another II e~)eriments report quite the contrary? 
Or vice versa, if a number of tests have disqualified my 
hypothesis, why could not following tests of equal number 
validate that hypothesiS to some extent? On positivist 
principles, this may be improbable but nonetheless possible. 
The non-terminating process of falsifiability Popper himself 
seems to recognize. l 4 And as such, positivists argue that 
complete falsifiability is inadequate as a criterion of 
meaning. 
Waismann adds a consideration from the scientific 
. 
Viewpoint ths. t woul'd further di scredi t Popper 's cri terion. 
11+ Ibid., 17, 19, 46, 48. 
-
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Theoretically, all tha.t is required to invalidgte a universal 
lav! is just one negative instnnce. However, Waismann re-
ID!J.rks, IIwhat astronomer liould abandon Kepler's 19.\<IS on the 
strength of a. single observation?"15 Scientists do, in fact, 
make the-most varied attempts at explaining deviations be-
fore rejecting so~e accepted law. 
In light of the inadequacies of Schlick's criterion 
of conclusive verifiability and of Popper's conclusive 
falsifiability, positivists were forced to reformulate their 
verification principle if it was to serve as a satisfactory 
criterion of meaning. Alfred J. Ayer, and the more con-
temporary positivists with him, have adopted weak or incon-
clusive verifiability as that principle. This will be the 
burden of tho following chapter. 
15 P. Waismann, "Symposium: Verifiability,lt 
Proceedinss 2t ~ Aristotelian Sooiety, Supple XIX, 1945, 
!~9. 
CHAPT3R III 
THE \4EAK SBNSE OF V j;RIPIABILI'rY 
A sentence is verifiable in a weak or inconclusive 
sense, ~rotessor Ayer explains, not it its truth can be 
definitely established in experience, but simply if experi-
ence can' render it probable. l Employing this more liberal 
critorion, he stAtes the new criterion of taotual meaning 
ot a proposition 1.n question torm: "Would any observations 
be relevant to the determination ot its truth or talsehood?,,2 
From Ayer's view, the meaning dogma has been elevated to 
its throne and Any statement that tails to meet its demands 
must forteit its right to tactual meaning. Of'importance 
to note is that, by means of the verifioation principle, 
AyeI' ,has segregated tactual st~tements f'rom all others. 
The residue, will be made up of tautologies and non-
sense. 
Tautologies or analytio stntements play an important 
role in positivist philosophy and must be oonsidered at some 
length. The tautologioal purports to assert nothing of tact; 
1 A. J. Ayer, Lansuage, 'rruth ~ Logic, New 
York, 19,51, 37. 
2 Ibid., 38. 
-
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it is purely A priori. Its whole function, according to 
Ayer, is to render explicit unsuspected and implicit im-
plications of one's assertions and beliefs.3 In short, 
the ta.utological makes for consistency in logical relation-
ships. For this reason, tautologies are not pieces of 
nonsense, but give us a special kind of knowledge. 
Precisely because they say nothing about reality, they 
oannot be confuted and are therefore certain. 
Included in tne tautological order are not only 
logic and mathematics but all class concepts, all universal 
ideas as well. The positivist is neither a realist nor a 
Kantian in regard to claas knowledge. Class notions have 
no objective validity whatever; nor are they. products of 
some ~ priori determinations of the mind to think according 
to certain categories. For the pOSitivist, tne only real 
• 
is the empiricB.l and class concepts Ilre froe creations of 
the human mind - arbitrary conventions which serve as short-
hand controls of empirical d~ta. 
The positivist exphmat:ion of cla.ss concepts, 
however, as complete and free creations of the mind, will 
not sta.nd up under a.n analysis of knowledge. Very generally, 
3 !2!2., 19-81. 
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there can be no object of the human mind 'Hhicn is absolutely 
and completely constructed by the mind without some initial 
point of departL;cre in experience. Even mathemAtics must have 
some stArting point in experinece, though the slight-
est. And in such cases ¥lhere there is partiR.l construction, 
'We are aware ot' this in reflection. 
B,.,t more specifically, class knowledge as well 
cannot be simply a,nd totlllly a mqtter of menta.l construc-
tion - there is ahrays a d~tum, a given. :ror from a phenom-
enological view of knowleoge, the mind encounters its object; 
it doss not ~ it. Now pOSitivists claim that the given 
is merely sensory and nothing more. But no true human 
experience can be purely sensory; some non-sensory element 
is always included which categorizes the sense datum and 
renders it mea.ningful. To the extent that I am able to 
verify "this is an animal" by some perception, what I per-
ceive must be "animalitylt in this. In othor words, the dg.tum 
includes R. class, a universal. This would be basic no matter 
how the relationship of class and inferior be explained qnd 
no mAtter whqt the ultimate psyehological and metaphysical 
explanation. In any case, with his rejection of this datum, 
the posItivist can never offer an adeqUAte expla.nation of 
the phenomenon of knowledge. 
AyeI' and positivists in eener!'!l, furthermore, 
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insist that the tautologica.l order is not only arbitrary 
a.nd completely independent o£ experience, but that it is 
also completely independent of the na.ture of the mind. 
'l'here are absolutely no Itlaws of thought. II The law of 
identity and non-contradictions according to Ayer, are purely 
arbitrary conventions, valid in their own right, and do not 
even depend upon incorpor9tion into a system.4 In brie£, 
they are valid by virtue of their form alone. It is per-
fectly conceivable to Ayer thflt we could have employed dir-
£erent linguistic conventions and that a. hundred years from 
now men may think according to different rules. Il'his is 
nothing else but intellectual suicide. 
Ayer notwithst~nding, man 1s capable or knowing 
being and the principles which necessarily follow upon being. 
In reflection 11e realizes that his intellect is moved to 
assent by the evidence or being; he rea.lizes that being, 
the whole of reality, is the object of his knowledge and 
that this Object is intelligible. By knowledge of being, 
then, roa.n at least implioitly underst9.nds th"l.t Itbeing is lt 
and I1that being cannot be and not be at the same time und.er 
the same respect." To this necessity.!! Earte !.!.!., there 
corresponds a necessity ~ parte mentis. Since man's 
4 Ibid.~· 81. 
-
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assent is determined by the evidence of being, the pr'inciples 
of identity and non-contradiction Are absolute neoessities 
of thought preoisely because identity and non-oontradiotion 
are intrinsio necessities of being. These prinoiples oannot 
be arbitrary conventions of ling'.istio use; they transoend 
la.nguage and have their roots in being i tselt. Human thought 
contrary to these principles is simply impossible. 
In our analysis thus far we have seen Ayer's 
oriterion of f'actw=!l meaning, namely, verifiability in 
principle. The tautologics.l or analytic, though devoid of 
i"actual meaning, 1s nonetheless meaningful wi trlin its own 
framework. A genuine proposition - and this corresponds 
roughly to Hume IS "re l.ations of ideas If and "matters of 
tact" - 1s either !!. priori or empirical. AyeI' oonoludes 
then that a.ny stntement which is neither ana.lytic nor em-
• 
pirioally verifiable is nonsensical. 5 All metaphysioal, 
1.13., all non-empirioal statements of existential import, 
are reduced to nonsense. The razor of verifiability has 
indeed out away a good deal of the flesh of hUluan knowledge. 
On what grounds now does Ayerireject metaphysios 
l-
as meaningless? On strictly metal,?hysioal grounds. Aocord-
ing to the verification prinoiple. a stptement whose 
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validity cannot be tested by sense observation is non- . 
sensical. The only real, consequently, is the empirical. 
The verification principle is itself a metaphysical state-
rnent concerning the Y1l1ture of reality, a metaphysic of 
empiricism dressed up in 20th century clothes. To identify 
vel~ifiabi li ty with. verifiabi Ii ty by sense experience, to 
limitche real to th.e sensible, is an arbitrary assumption 
which begs the whole question of epistemology ,and metaphysics 
from the st·:lrt. 
Let us review the arguments of several philosophers 
who bring to light the arbitrary and metaphysical character 
of Ayer's anti-metaphysical views. Dr. A. C. Ewing, first 
of all, asks how the posi ti vist esta.blishes the truth of 
his view that sense observation 1s the 801e determinant of 
factual meaning.6 This c~nnot be shown to be true even in 
a single case of ",t:.:;llse experience, argues Ewing. For how 
could the positivist ever know by sense experience thnt 
there is not a part of the meaning of a statement which 
he simply cannot verify? And the fact thnt we do not have 
any sense experience of the pArt in question proves nothing, 
aince the whole question is whether there is something in 
6 A. C. Ewing,. "Meaninglessness, rt Mind, XLV, 
-177. 353. 
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what we me~m th~ t transcends the empirical. .aut how could 
the posi tivist know by sense experience th9.t there is not? 
At the outset, the verific9.tion principle must be an arbi-
trnry lim1 t~tion on the scope of human experience Rnd fl. 
metaphysical assertion limiting reality to the empirical. 
John Laird brings out essentially the same point 
in a variant argumont. Any form of empiriciam, Laird con-
tends, is a metaphysic - a doctrine about ultimates, assert-
ing that, f'·,r any human thinker, the only ultima.tes are 
contained in human emEei~.7 Should the positivist deny 
he is asserting anything ultimate, he continues, there is 
ati 11 no way out. frhe posi ti vist is caught between the 
horns of a dilemma: either he gives no reason for his 
insistence on sensory exrrcrienco and his doctrine becomes 
purely arbitrary; or he gives a reason, which, on his own 
showing, is merely provisional and not ultimate. In that 
case, he would ostenSibly be refraining from metaphysics 
out of policy, but would covertly be admittJng that there 
a.re ultimate rea.sons for his position. Posi ti vists A.re 
not anti-metaphysicians -then, but only metaphysioians in 
disguise. 
7 John Laird, "Positivism, Empiricism a.nd 
Metaphysics,lt Proceedings of the Aristotelian SOCiety, 
XXXIX, 218. - -
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!".faphael Dem.os, finally, exposes the capricJous 
nature of the positivlBt stand in a moat ElIl1phatic ... ·my. B 
On the positivist t s o"m principles, we recall, Olla does not 
challenl"!'o rulea; they are arbitrary conventions valid in 
virtue of their f'orm alone. Now the positivist is the close 
friend of J:r!Odl.;lrn science a,nd makes it clear that phis i8 i-lhat 
b • , • :i ~.!! ~~ y eV:,loence In so .ence. All \<1ell and rood, says Demos, 
but He mean, somethin' more by evidonoe in Illetaphy~'3ic s. Ii' 
rules are purely arbitrary and if the metaphysicia.n does not 
adopt the rules of the scientist - as the posltivist deplores 
he does not - by wha.t rirrht does he criticize the metaphysician 
for not conforminp to the rules of the scientlst? dhy should 
he quest:i.on the rules of the metaphysician at all? 
The same -anoral objection may be applied to the 
positivist doctrine of mElanin,". On what basis dOOR the 
positivist doterrnine the meaninf!: of meanin:1':? Hls onl:y-
criterion is the linf"'uistic usarte of science. But, once 
a.~aln, the lin'uist1c usat8 in metaphysics is that !'!!.eanin'~ 
does not mean the sarne as in scienee. Honetheless, 
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positivists criticize the metaphysiciRn for not conforming 
to scientific uS~.ge, ,\l1hich, as Demos rern"lrks, !tis like 
scolding somebody for spaaking French accordlng to French 
grammar nnd contra_!'y to English grammal'. "9 
Clearly, the verific~tion principle arb1trQrl1y 
limi ts evi,~;ence tlnd meanin[J;, J:!nd rejects metaphysics beCAuse 
the principle itself involves a met"physics. Indeed, the 
positivist cannot but help adopt some theory of the universe, 
some ltJorld view; to serve 9.3 the foundptlon stones of his 
views on science, history, psychology, ethlcs, theology 
and 80 on. The verification principle, however, in destroy-
ing metaphysics, necessa.rily destroyes itself. It destroys 
itself precisely beCAuse it itself is a metaphysic qnd be-
ca.use it includes in the realm of nonsense the philosophical 
principles 01) which its O\ID conclusions depend. 
But let us return to Professor Ayer's formul1'ltion 
of the v~rlfic~tlon principle. A st~tement h~s factuql 
mGaning, he Rr'fued, only if observB.tions can be mAde which 
l;lOUld be relev!!lnt to its truth or' f~lsehood.lO But hRS 
9 ill.!!., 383 •. The same genera 1 arg1L'1lent is 
advRnced by John \ii sdom In It IVletaphysics (md Veri ficA tion, " 
rUnd." XLVII, October, 1938, 452-498. 
-
10 A. J. Ayer, Langgase, Truth ~ Logic, New 
York, 1951, 26. 
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any philosopher, to the most extreme sceptic or idealist, 
ever made a stl'lte:nent to ti.'le truth of wh1c11 he did not think 
some observation or other WqS relev~nt? On the same point, 
Isaiah Berlin contends that relevance is not a preoise 
logicsl category, realizing that nfantastic "metaphysic",l 
systems" are free to claim that observations are relevant 
to their truth. ll 
To avoid this difficulty, AyeI' attempt~ another 
formule.tlon of the verification princtI-'le. He st!?t;es it 
thus: 
••• it is the m!-1rl{ of ~ genuine proposition, not th~t 
it should be equivalent to an exverimBntRl propusition 
(one which records an 9.ctual or possible observation), 
or any finite number of experiential propositions, 
but simply that some experiential propositions can 
be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other 
premis!~ without be:i.ng deducible from thosd premises 
alone. 
It is to be noted, first of all, that this formulation 
involves some inferential process. ~ut how can AyeI' know. 
from sense experience alone whether an inference 1s legit-
imate or not? Surely not from logic or mathematics, for 
these sciences are tautological, saying nothing at all about 
reality - and presumably Professor Ayer-,is saying something 
11 I. Berlin, "Verifiability in Principle, tI 
Proceedings £! ~ Aristotelian Socletl, XXXIX, 233. 
12 A. J. Ayer, Lansuage, Trut~ ~ Logic, New 
York, 1951, 38-39. 
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of factual import. Since the, principles 01' inference 
assuredly cannot be objects of empirical observation, how 
can AyeI' determine the vnlidity of any inferential process? 
Perhaps a more embarrassing dift'fculty is thqt now 
the verification principle fl.llows meaning to any statement 
whatsoever. AyeI' himself admits this deficiency in the 
revised edition of Langua&e, Truth ~ Logic, giving the 
example • 
••• the stl1tements "the absolute is l.a.,zyll and nif the 
absolute is lazy, this is whiten jointly entail the 
obsorvation-stntement "this is white, n ana since "this 
is white" does not follow from either of ' these premises, 
taken by i taelf, both of them sf.!tisfy my criterion of 
meaning.13 
To emend the difficulty by leaving out the part about other 
premises would exclude hypothetlcals from the class of em-
pirical propos! tions a.nd, therefore, make nonsense of scien-
tific theories. So Professor A;rer attempts to meet the • 
difficulty by still another l'ormulation of the verifiCAtion 
prinCiple. Though more lengthy ~lnd involved tha.n the 
original formulation, it deserves quotqtion in full: 
••• a stotement is directly verifiable if it is either 
itself Bn observqtion-stqtement, or is such that in 
13 Ibid., 11-12. I. Berlin pointed out this 
difficulty in "Verifiability in Principle," Proceedinss of 
~ Ari3totelia~ Societz, XXXIX, 234, 
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conjunction ',Ni th one or more observation-stAtemnnts 
it entails at least one observ~tlon st!1temcnt which is 
not deducible from these other premises alonA; ~nd .... 
a statement is indirectly verifiable if it satisfies 
the folloldng conditions: first, that in conjunction 
wi t.l:1 certain other prem ses it entails one or more 
directly verifiable statements which a.re not deducible 
from these other premises alone; and secondly,-that 
these other premises do not include a.ny st9tement that 
is not either analytiC, or directly verifiable, cr 
ea;;:>a.ble of being independently estRblished as indirectly 
veri:Ciabla. l 4 
A st0tement has factual meaning, then, if it is either directly 
or indirectly verifiable. 
It is interesting to note what pOSitivists them-
selves have to say about Ayer's revised criterion. Accord-
ing to Carl Hempel, this criterion, like Popper's criterion 
of complete falsifinbi li ty, all~Hvs fllctur:ll significance to 
any conjunction 1.,;ha tever .• lS An explnnn tion of terminolohry 
may be nccess9ry to follm>' Hempel's reasoning. By S.N h~ 
-
means the expression obtained by oO!ineoting two sentencos 
by the lJO:t:'k ~, fo~ example, nal1 SH'fUlS nre white and the 
absolute is perfect.:' 'rake the conjunction S.N, wher'e S 
sFI.tisfies Ayarts crit;erioll, while Ii Is a st~telnent like 
"the abso1uto is porfect,n whlch is to be rejocted by the 
1$ C. Hempel, "Problems ~nd Changes 
liinpiricist Crj terion of Heaning," Revue • .:.:.!~~:fQ.t.:::t:~~/Vt"J:-. 
S.! 1hllosophie, IX, 1950, 50. 'Y-& 
srune criterion. Hempel pOints out, however, thAt 
••• whptever conseqtlences Cl1n be deduced from 3 ld th 
the help of legitimate subsidiary hypotheses can also 
be deduced from S.N by means of the ".IJ.me subsidiAry 
hypotheses, and as Ayer's new criterion is formulated 
essentj.~ lly in terms of the deduci hi 1i ty of A. certain 
type of consequence from the given sentence, it 
count3nances S.N along with 3.16 
And Professor Church makes subst9.nti~J.ly the sqme point in 
his review of Ayer's second edition of Langu8gB,' Truth ~ 
Loe;ic.17 
The verific~tion principle becomes more flnd more 
Sll.spect and Ayer himself hedges more and more. He tells 
u.s, you recall, thAt a stqtement is f'3ctu!:Illy meaningful 
(non-a.nalyti~), if, And only if, it I::; either directly or 
indirectly verifiable. But this becomes shortly: uunless 
it (a factual statement) satisfied the princ~ple of ver-
ificnti on, it v!ould not be capable of being understood in 
• 
the sense in which either scientific or com:non-sense stf1te-
menta are hs.bi tually understood. nlB All this me p..n s , ilow-
ever, is thnt unless a statement he.s the sort of verifica-
tion a scientific or common-sense st'ltem::>;nt has, it wi 11 
16 ills!. 
17 A. Church, "Revie\-1 of Languaf6, Truth and 
Logic,'! !ournal 2£. SYE!boli~ Loeie, xlv, 19 9, 52-53.-
18 A. J. Ayer, L~nguage, Truth ~ Logic, New 
York, 1951, 16. 
not be a scientific or common-sense st'ltem!2!ntJ 'rhus John 
\;asdoru amusing1:! 1":;:;i tes thnt by 8.n analysis of the: verifi CA-
tion princip10 ",,~e Rrrive at its complement"ry pl':1titude, 
thAt "every 801"t of st!"'tement h9.S its own sort of l1'lr'Bning. nl9 
Indeed, on AyeI" S ovm admission, thi s sup;.::osedly 
self-evident criterion of meaning is not all it seemed to 
be. To quote Professor AyeI': 
In putting fO!'l-lard the principle of v9.l·ificRtion as 
a criterion of meaning, I do not overlook the tact 
thqt the t?ord "meaning" is cOllh'1lonly used in a v9.rioty 
of senses, and I do not wish to deny that in some of 
these senses a statement may properly be said to be 
manningful even thougtL i tis ned ther anR lytic or em-
pirically verifiable.'O 
And again: 
It is indeed open to anyone to adopt a different cri-
tel'10n of' meaning and so to produce an 8lternative 
definition which may very well correspond to one of 
the way;.;. in wnich the work !lrllearl1ngr! is com;:ncillly usod. 
And if a statement sntisried such a criterion. there 
is" no li0Ubt, sume proper use of t;:18 work ttl,iuderstaI\d-
ing" in W.{l.1ch it would be capable of beine understood. 21 
The verification principle, consequently, is quite incapable 
of eliminating metaphysics or ."lnything else. And for' this 
we have Ayer's own testimony: 
19 J. Wi sdom, "Note on the New Ed! tion of 
Professor Ayar's LanSiun~e, 'fruth ~ LogiC," ~. LvII, 
October" 1948, 418. 
20 A. J. Ayer, Language, 'frutI'!: ~ Logic, New 
York, 19:;1, 1':;. 
21 ~., 16. 
••• AI t.tlOugh I should still lik"! to ~d9f'end t.he use of 
the criterion of verifiability as a methodological 
principle. I realize that for the effectiv0 eliMin~tion 
of metaphysics it needs to be supported by det~iled 
analyses of p~rticul!1r met~ph:rsical :U'glLv>nts. 2 
A fr'ank anG honBst admission, to he sure. 
Though difficulties wit t}1e verification pr'inciple 
hf!lve multiplied, many positivists, Inc:_uding Hempel, Frank, 
Stace, Feigl ~nd Church, believe s"l.tisf:1.ct-JT'Y solutions 
may still be reached by 1.:1. systemntlc use of the logistiC 
method. 23 \ve ask th':~ further quet,tion, then, 't-lheth,3l', on 
pOsitivist principles, 1.:1. justificqtion of this principle 
as a criterion of meaning is at RY.l possible. Now the 
positivist micht offnr either !!. priori or empiricBl re~f';ons 
to estp,blish his posj .. tion. But he is barred fr:::;;m giving 
8.ny !!. priori re?.sun b eC\:luse, on 0.is own sayine:;, the !. .eriori 
is ? free cre£ltion of the human mind incap9.blc of' justi:fy-
• 
lng nny theory Wh9.tsoev(~r. And he cannot ever attempt to 
offer el'l1piric:'lll reasons since nn empirical inspection of 
moanini is a. loe;iclll i:mpos$ibili ty contradicting the ver·y 
notion of' "verifiability in principle." If th'3 verification 
principle cannot be justified in eitber of these two ways. 
it must be considered A..purely arbitrary assumption. 
22 
23 
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Professor tv. T. Sta.ce has proposed wh8t he con-
siders to be a more basic criterion of mCRning than Ayer's. 
which he stntes as follows: 
A sentence, in order to be significant" mus t ftSSert 
or deny facts which :tl.re of a kind or' cl~ss such thi:lt 
it is lOLically possible '~Lirec·tly to ob;:;erve some fa.cts 
which are instqnces of that cl!-1sS or kind. And if a 
sentence purports to 8ssert or deny fa,cts,·:hich are 
of a class or kind such that it would be logicRlly 
impossible directly to observe any inst0nce of that 
class or kind, then the sentence is non-significant. 24 
Ayer, however, denies thr,t the verification principle rests 
upon such a, principle. He argues the t l-Jh1le it is true 
that every str-'ltement thqt is allowed to be meaningful by 
the principle of observable kinds is 11180 allowed to be 
meaningful by the vAriflcation principle, the converse 
of this does not hold. 25 AyeI' rejects stace's proposal as overly 
liberal. 
Carl Hempel likewise rejects the principle of 
observable kinds. In his opinion, it suffers from the same 
deficiency as Ayerts first formulation of the verific"ltion 
principle, namely, that it would allow f9.ctual significance 
of any stptement whatever. 26 In the same article Hempel 
24 
1944" 218. 
25 
1951, 14. 
\-J. T. Stace" "Positivism," Mind, LIII" 211, July, 
-
26 Carl Hempel, "Problems and Changes in the Empiri-
cist Criterion of Henning," Revue Intern?ticnale 2.2. Phl1osophie, 
IX, 1950, 49-50. 
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advnncer'j a fUrther substitute criterion ca.lled "transle.t-
abillty into an 6lTlpirlci:;t lanitu8.r;-e. n 'nds criterion be 
does not fully develop, but even should it be found more 
satisfactory than previous criteria, it would still fuca 
the i:mpoT't~mt and basic problem of justification. 
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To this line of reasontnp; the positivist miFht reply 
that his criterion is ind8ed arbitrary. He ",:ollle', explain that 
the criterion is an, arbitrary convention about Hhat he under-
'"'7 ~tands by meaning which, as such, requires no justlf:i.('atlon.t::. i' "' .. ____ _ 
Very well. 13ut if this be bis stand, as iW:t:np~ remarks, the posi-
tivist is excu"1 from havinr'" to prove h18 theory f1onl7f at the 
expense of arlmittinr that there is no more reason for acr~tin~ 
it than there i~! for ace'''ptinr.: a.ny theorY what"ver. n28 
No, answers Frofessor Ayar, the verification principle 
is not SUH')ose to he tfentirely arbitraryH because unless a state 
ment satisfied this criterion of moanin7 , it could not be under-
stood a~ scientific and common-sense statem<)nt,:" are. ;5ut all thi 
means,as potntad out previously,ls that unless a statement has 
the kind ot verification a sclGntific or con@on-gense statement 
has, it will not b/:;:) a scientific or COIDrnon-senSB statem:;;nt" 
Granted, I say. but vIe are now a lonF iPJay from the posit1vist IS 
the 
announC€l'ment of/v,~r:lfication princ1.ple as 1~ criterion 
of meanina,a universal criterion,capable of ellminatln~ all meta-
physics and of solving all outstandinG philosophica.l disputes. 
27 C. Hempel, "Probloms and Changes in the.',ulpiricist (it j f" i II 1:' '( t n t* 1 d"a -L",~] ph" IX' :'[' er _on O!'i(-jan. U.s::'. l(eVUe .:;;.~r a .lone. e. l'U-,- _'?30 "l.e, , \., 
1950, 60. 
28 A, C.t;wlnt;, IIMeanin::tltHJSneSS," f'iind, X.LV, 351. 
Pap bas argued in reply that the verification prInciple can be 
justified by introspection. (~J.:.~nts of ~lytic fJdlosophy, 
New York,1()49,3!~J).) But this is outside ot; the v{';T'ification prin-
riple since such evirienco cannot, even in principle, be verified. 
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There ls a more fundamental reason, however, '-thich 
clo::;83 all avenU(:lS of justification to the positIvist. F'ro:r~l the 
.start, the positivist limits trueknowledr:e {non-analytic) to the 
correlation of observational data. The hurnan knower cannot rise 
above the level of sensation, By \-Jhat possible means, then, can 
the validity of sense knowledp'e be established?3ensation, by 
nature, does not carry with it its own .ju:ltifica.tion. 30cause 
the Ranses are limited and conditioned by matters, vdth sense 
kn01dedr-€J alone mnn could neVE;r make a completeret~ and reflect 
back on the nature and validity of his act and faculty of sense. 
OYt his premises, the po;itivist can never hope to give a rational 
account of his theory. 
More fundamentally still, the positivist can find no 
jU,s;tification of the verification principle without appealinp.; to 
metaphysics - and that, a metaphYSics of empiricism. To assert 
that the only true )(no\<Jledr~'e is reducible to 8anSt) is imvlicitly 
to assert that the only real is tne sensible. This metaphysical 
assertion the positivist cannot and never attempts to prove. It 
is his tni ti8,l act of faith. 
Future attsmpts to formulate a verification principle, 
even should they be suceeRsful to the extent of eliminatinr- the 
lo~ical defioiencies of prevIous formulations, will all nece~sari­
ly labor under this basic diffioulty of justification. Thou.f!:h 
the positivi9t problem with justification should alone call into 
question the .fundamental tenets of pOSitiVism, we shall consider 
further difficulties in the followin n ' chapter. 
CHAPT£m IV 
'rUb bASIC PROPOSlt'ION 
In olose and essential connection with tne 
verification principle is the question of "basic propositions." 
A thorough examination of positivism demands an analysis of 
their meil.ning qnd function within the positivist scheme. 
Basic proposi tiona may be described 9 .. 8 those which 
can be immediately compared with reality, i.e., with the data 
of sense experience. 'I'hey are supposed, therefore, to desig-
nate the immediately given, the content of one's present sense 
experience.1 Examples of such propositions "lould be of the 
type: "It seems to me I teel oold;" "It looks to me that the 
grass is green." 
Now the importance of basic propositions derives from 
our considertttion of the verification prinCiple. \fJe noted there 
the positivist clAim that all factual propOSitions refer' 
ultimately to our sense-contents. Consequently, all propositions 
\>lhich are not themselves basic necessarily become "truth-
.tunc ti ons 11 of basic propos! t.~ons. All factual proposi tions, 
furthermore, must be reducible to proposi tions about t.tH'~ 
immediAtel:;/' [1 van. OthHrvlise, they are me~ningless. Here then 
1 A. J. Ayer, "Basic PropOSitions," Philosophicnl 
Anal~sis, ed. Max Black, Ithaca, 1950, 67. Victor Kraft;~e 
Vienna Circle, New York, 1953, 117. ---
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lies tlje iJr,portance of the basic proposition: hrithin the posi-
tivist system it becomes the ult:Lmate criterion of :r.1eanin:- and 
truth. 
Since the early ml0etin s of the Vienna Circle 
posltiv?st8 have discussed the questton of basic propositions 
under differing terminolof"Y. IrJitt(fenstein distlnpuished be-
tween !!atomietf and "molecular" propositions in roferrlng to 
b[;.lsic and non-bf.l.sio propo~3itions. J';,ach used the German 
E!.£~~k~J.:_~a~z to describe a proposi tion involving immediate 8Gn~je 
data and thus we have the expression I!protocoll! or "elementary" 
proposition. F'inally, the tGn11 lIostensive ll and more recently 
I!ba~dc 11 proposition has been populari zed by A.yer. 'rhus there 
is r;eneral at'reernent amon< positivists that there is a class of 
~~tate.ments which are ~3irapler and Tnore easily verifiable than 
other statements. 
Agreement, however, stops here. Basic propositions 
are supposed to d,:::~Jlr·nate the irrmwdiately':lven, but, in the 
positivist circle, Just what propositions satisfy the 
requirement is itself a matter of dispute. :.::,arly positivists 
re~':arded the tr·lven H as con:::listin::" in sense and foollDP.: 
qualities. But for Carnap the "iven con8isted in total 
expc;rienees and rf)latlon!.ll bet'Hoen them \-lh:i.le Heurnth considered 
physical ~dtuations as the initial data. 2 ~.bat remains in 
2 Victor r:raft, 'rhe Vienna Circle, Ne\'\i' Yop);::, 1 .'3, 118. 
dispute and doubt for the empiric~l positlvlts, we note, are 
the very foundations of empirical knowledge. 
A second paint of dispute, ana one of gref:lter moment 
to positivists, concerns the certitude of these basic proposi-
tions. The question divides positivists into two sharply 
de{'ined camps, camps which loglc'illly debate as well the issue 
of stl'ong or we::tk voriflabl1i ty as a criterion of meaning. 
The rightists who follow \V1ttgenstein and Schlick malnta.in 
th~t basic propositions are absolutely certain, while the 
leftists f'ollovling Cnrnap and AyeI' 8.rgue that they have no 
mOI'e certitude than qny other factua.1sta tement. The question 
in positivist phra.seology is the "incorrigibilitylt versus the 
"corrigibility" of basic propositions. 
:r1rst of all, let us trace the reasons offered for 
the two contradictory opinions. !t/i ttgenstein and his camp 
• 
argue that basic propositions, in as much as they directly 
record an immediate experience, are indubitable and inca.p3ble 
of being refUted by any further experience. J The underlying 
reason why some positivists claim certitude for one class of 
propositions seems .. in order to establish a. basis .from which 
other propositions might derive their validity. These men 
.3 Carl Hempel, "On tho Logicel Positivists Theory 
of Truth,1t Ana1;ysis, II, 4, Jsn., 19.35, 192. 
apparently rea.lized the completely arbitrary ana hypothetical 
chara.cter all propositions vJOUlC1 incur unless certi tude, in one 
area at least, wS.s cla.imed as a stqrting point. For if certain 
premises can lead to certain conclusions, mere hypotheses can 
only le~d to hypotheticai conclusions. Wittgenstein anu other 
pOSitivists saw the danger of a house built on sand, which a 
philosophy would necessarily be if' la.cking solid foundations, 
and hence they maintained the basic proposition as absolutely 
certain. Their point l·.rould appear a good one. 
Implicity, nt Hny rS.te, this group of positivists had 
adopted a correspondence theory of truth. Their claim was thFlt 
basic propositions could be immedi~tely compered with reality 
and, hence, were indubitable. Ano'cher group, however, led by 
Carnap and NeurHth, denied that vie can ever compare propositions 
with reality.4 As a consequence, this seconci group, iev~loped 
what has come to be oalled n coherence or consistency theory of 
truth. 
This "coherence lt is simply the agreement of ~ proposi-
tion with otner accepted propositions. Thus a proposition 
would be If true II within a given system if it Has consistent with 
the rest of tho system. What is .also true, however', 1s th~t 
there may be many other~ systems in which tho proposi tion in 
118-119. 
4 Victor Kraft, ~ Vienn! Circle, New York, 1953, 
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question is "false. n On their Oi'iTI empirical premises posi ti vista 
realized thnt coherence could never be ultim~tely established 
or thqt anyone system couLd disprove a.nother. 1:/i til the methods 
of scientific procedure in mind, Carnrlp qnd his follol,'Ters con-
cluded t~ult empirical knowledge CBn never yield truth but 
only probability ~nd, secondly, th~t no proposition tncorporBted 
in a system is exempt from possible elimi.nation in the future.5 
For this reason thoy logieR lly cIt" imed thp t be.sic proposi tins 
. 
were just as hypothetica.l and cor'rigible as ~ny oth8r empii.·ic~l 
proposition. 
Thus for' thi s second group of posi ti vists, basic 
propositions, like every other, are At the end accepted or 
rejected by a decision. The nrbitrary j:md purely convential 
character of positivist tenets could not be more ~ppqrent. 
With such a st'::md, positivists themselves were confronte<l with 
a. new question of equal importance. If basic propositions are 
denied nny certitude whetever and thus become corrigible, how 
can one determine under what conditions 9. basic proposition 
si.lould be abandoned nne! und'9r what condi tions it must be 
aocepted? t.Phi s rern.qjns their problem. In stqting the reasons 
fo~ Ayer t , rejectio~ of the c~rtitude of basic propositions, 
"tve sh~11 find one attempt at a solution. 
----------------
5 Fe 11x Kaufmann, "Ver·j ficr-ltion, ij;e~nlng, ane. l'ruth., II 
Philosophy ~ PhenomenologicRl Rese8rch, IV, 1943-1944, 283. 
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First of all, Professor AyeI' argues, no proposition 
can be purely ostensive or basic, for thi s \-10111,[ imply that 
Itth0re CQuld be A. sentence which consisted of purely demonstra-
tive symbols ~nd was I1t the sa"lle time int~lligible.1t6 "This 
here and. now" assuredly does not make any sense. Se!ltences of 
purely demonstrative symbols, then, would not express genuine 
propositions and hence could not even be considered as the 
starting-point of a science. lllint AyeI' realizes--and tillS 
repeats Kant IS comment reg~"rdinD the c!=ltegories--is thFlt one 
carmot in langu"age point to an object Hi thout in some way 
describing it. So if a proposition is to be genuine, one 
cannot merely name q situation; one must say something 
about it. But in describing a situation, AyeI' remarks, "one 
is not merely tregistc)ring 1 a sense-content, one is classifying 
it in som<~ WAy or other, and this menns going beyond wha.t is 
immediately given."1 (Italics mine.) As noted previously, 
all class concepts for the. positivist are free and arbitrary 
constructions of the mind and, as such, not pt?rt of the dqta 
of experience. This arbitrary ~nd (!onstructurAl nature of' the 
class, consequently, prevents a pOSitiVist's claim for certitude 
6 A. J. Ayer, Lanpu~ge, Truth and Logi~, New York, 
195J., 91. 
1 Ibid. 
-
45 
in nny proposi tion tIhich involves classificAtion. Since, as 
Ayer recognizes, clA.sslfic~ti(m is neCeSSClP? for any intelJ.igible 
proposition, hA logic.tlily concluded th!i tall proposi tionsare 
but hypotheses and hence neVer certain. 
Within the positivist scheme, Ayer's point is well-
taken. Though he qualifies the above argument in the new intro-
duction of ~ngua.ge. '~ruth !!.ru! Log!c, his position remains 
. 
substantially the same. He would now admit tha.t there is 
a class of propositions \iliich may be called "incorrigible." 
"For if one intends to do no more than merely record what is 
experienced ,,;1thout relatine it to anything elSA," writes Ayer, 
"it is not possible to be factually mistaken. lt8 But this 
makes little difference, since, as Ayer goes on to say, lithe 
mere recording of one fa present experie;jce does not serve to 
convey any ini'orm1ltion either to any othAr person or indeed to 
onese1f."9 Intelligibility necessitates classification and 
classification for AyeI' necessArily excludes certitude. 
That Professor Ayer still upholds the hypothetical 
chnracter of all factual propositions is further attested to in 
one of his recent essays. In responding to the question, 'tIs 
anything certain?1t Ayer contends tn.qt the qnswer depends on 
the meaning rules of a language. But as to whether these rules 
8 ~., 10. 
9 Ibid. 
can gu<:!rantee the truth or .ff.1lsi ty of a given st.,tement, Ayer IS 
thOU~lt is most cle~r: uIn neither case is doubt excluded."lO 
With RI1. possibility of certitude excT'1"-'(~, ":11,,] 
justification does Ayer offer tor the hypothetic!:}l ch!lracter 
of the post tivist structure? iJhnt criterion does he advance 
to test the validity of factual proposi ti ~ms which, we rec q 11, 
are j:)ll hypotheses? In th;:; first place, AyeI' stqtes, hypotheses 
a.re "rules which govern our expectation of future experience. till 
They enable us to ronks successful predictions of' futUre 
experience and so are necessary for hunl'~n life. 'l'he criterion, 
therefore, by which to test the valiciity of factual propositions 
is whether or not they fulfill the function they 9. re designed 
to fulfill, namely, to anticipate experience. 12 So if' an 
observation conforms to our expectations, the probability 
of our original hypothesis is increased; but 1f the observation 
1s contrary, the probability is decreased. In neither a~se, 
however, Cl=ll1 there be a question of absollJte truth or falsity 
because futUre observations may f.llirl~YS di Baredi tour i'inding. 
By whAt oriterion, then, does one decide to acoept or reject 
a propOSition, be it basic or otherwise? Ayer's answer is 
10 A. J. Ayer, tteasic Propositions,lt PhilosoEhical 
Analysis, ed., Max Black, Ithaca .. 1950, 74. 
11 A. J. Ayar, LanEjua.ge, Truth ~ LoSic, New York, 
1951, 97. 
12 Ibid., 99. 
-
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simple: by its efficiency in predicting future exper:i.ence. 
(Note the silnilari t:r betHeen this explAnation pnCt the procedure 
of modern science.) 
The above line of' rensoning is r,> summ~ry presentr.ltion 
or Proressor Ayer's view. More importAnt, however, is the 
justitic" tion offered for hi s cri tori on 01" v81idi ty. No\-1 the 
assentiA::" feAture in this mAtter of prediction, AyeI' avows, 
is the use of past expArience as a guide to the future. l3 
This, of course, rests on the assumption thAt the past is a 
reliable guide to the future, or, to put it in other words, 
" " 
thRt future experie11ce will be in9ccordnnce lrlith pa.st.; AyeI' 
openly admits this to be an assumption,l4 and stntes further 
th~t "there is no sense 1n asking for a theoretical justifica-
tion of this policy." l 5 Indeed, any attempt at justification 
would involve ODe in a pseudo-problem, since, on positivist 
• 
premises, justification is not eVen theoretically possible. 
So, one might S9.y, after all "G1:1is, we are back where 
we stnrted. 1tJe are offered not even th.e hope of a rational 
justificqtion of the Antire positivist structure. HIEothetical 
remains the indelible ch~racter of positivism. That such a 
13 ~., 97. 
14 ~., 47. 
15 Ibid. , 98. 
-
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fins.l answer could ever s~ ti sfy the hUman upiri t t sinner dri ve 
for truth, ~1S need not answen~. It is simple dest.l~ucti va of 
intellectual life. M'1n 1s naturally eU'rious; he "wonders, rt to 
use Plato J s term. :Phis reduct! vely sceptical stAnd of the 
pcsi ti vi~t cannot sntisfy 11l~n t s dynnmic yep-rning fox' a. 
r'1tional under~,tia.nd1ng of things. 
In all ff!lirness to Professor Ayer, hov-rever, 9. further 
cormnent is necess~ry. Sensing the arbitrariness of his criterion 
of validity, AyeI' forsees the obvious question: is it not ir-
rational then to oxpect future experience to conform to past? 
No. he answers, 1'0):" this is p, probable hypothesis. But what 
Can :erobab,ilitI meAn in this context? Not ~nyintrinsic 
property of the proposi tion, wr! tes Ayer, for to say that 
an observ~.tion increases the probability of an hypothesis 
means only thtlt tltho observ~tlon lncrep',ses th'.: degree of 
confidence with which it is ratlonn.l to entertain the 
hj'1'othesis."16 In short, probnbility meBns R reticmal belief. 
It is hera thn.t we strike At the heart of 90s1tivism; here 
its purpose And nflture become most lucid. 
Ratipnal belief J thf;l:.t Is the crux of the quec~tion. 
And this, st"'tes Ayer, is 11 belief '-'thlch is Rrrlvad at by the 
methods we now cOI,lsider reliabl§.17 What methods? "There is 
16 Ibid~" 101. 
17 Ibid., 100. 
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no absolute stnndArq; of rationnlity, ..... We trust the methods 
of contempornry scif'!nce because the] have been successful in 
practice." lB Such is Ayer's ultiro"lte answer anu positivism 
cOon be viewed in its true colors as simply the hf-lndm!lid of 
modern science. 
This ~ppeR1 to sci<::nce, we rec~11, is basically 
the 88me as Ayer's final attempt to justify his criterion 
of menning. Unless a st,"tement satisfied the principle of 
verifiability, he wrote, tlit would not be capable of being 
understood in the sense in which scientific hypotheses or 
common-sense stqtements are habitually understood.,,19 This 
is something of an anomaly, philosophy appe.!11ii1g to science for 
a justification of its tenets. Success in prq.ctice modern 
science has enjoyed. lrlhile this Justifies to some extent the 
scientist.s use of scientific methods, it hardly justifies 
• 
the POSl. ti vist dei:1And for the I!Idoption of scientific procedure 
in philosophy and in all ')ther disciplines. Many scientists, 
furthermore, are not content v.Ii til th<3 mere prRgm~tic justif'lca-
tion ::f science. Men like Bddi::1gton, Jea.ns, Ca ssirer,. Burtt,. 
vJhitehead,. Northrop and others engaged in met?physlca1 
18 ill!!. 
19 Ibid. 14. 
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investigA.tion because ther'e was ~ felt need for it. The 
pr~ctlc~l success of science CR.nnot long sAtisfy mqn's desire 
for' a I'r:ltionnl ex:olanntion of thind;s tl.nd certainly it cannot 
justify the philosophical and b'1sic~lly metaphysical doctrines 
of positivism. 
'rhus, in SUmn1lu'y, we see the dilemma facing posl ti vists 
OVer the question of bf1sic propositions. Either they clnim 
certitude for basic propositions end so estqblish some founda-
tion for their conch1.sions or tt:I'}Y deny this certitude qnu so 
reduce R.1l factual propositions to empirical hypotheses. In 
the former case, the "rgUl!l8nts of AyeI' concerning classification 
show the claim for cert.itude to bl'} unwarranted; thereby bringing 
to light the hypothetical and ~rbltrary nBture of positivism. 
In thn lAttl'}r c~sc, the open exclusion of 13.11 certitude serves 
only to bring this nAture into clearer focus •. Neither nlterna-
tive is satisfactory and, with the positivist notion of class 
concepts as plwe constructions of the mind, there is no 
possibility of 8 third choice. 
On this point, then, it A.p~~'eflrs thRt positivists 
will be forced to make A further and more thorough e.nalysis 
of the d~tt'l of consciousness. This, in turn, Hill compel them 
to widen the scope of evidence 50 as to a~~t a non-sensory 
component of experience, the Cl~5S or universel. Such 
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an admission would necessi tf'lte a. l'9dicn. 1 revision of the 
positivist doctrin3 of the given as sense da.ta alone '1nd 
of experience as sensation 1110ne. A revision of this nature. 
finally, would affect thqt most essentiql feature of 
positivism. the verification principIA" acting as a wedge 
dr'iven into it so as to shatter' it. 
OHAP'l'~H V 
POSITIVIST E'llllIOS 
In considering both the question of justificqtion of 
thr; v'5ri~'ication principle «(''hap. III) and the que:ition of basic 
ppopositions (Chap", IV). we have focus~d upon the arbitrnry 
chf:l.!'''cter of positivist doctrine. Positivists themselves are 
not altogether tu1e.'\<mre of this fa1.1in~.~ pnd it l.wuld Bpponr the 
underlying ref:!son for their recent concern 1:Ji th metaphysics, 
understood in a broad sense. l 
Other factors also are reponsible for the new 
positivist accent on "first philosophy. n Fi!'st, there appnars 
to be a growing awareness among anAlysts that existential pro-
posl tiona possess, after alI, 8. unique char~cter 'ii!hicb. defies 
purely verbal analysis and which, consequently, can be hp,ndled 
only by B science of the real. 2 Secondly, the original 
posi ti vist s.tti tude of regn rding proposi tions as independent 
enti ties is grndua.lly broadening to admit a consider"tion of 
the ment~l act of judgment Hh:tchfinds expression in a 
proposition. In 9ny ~ase, though positiVists have not 
1 Of. Gustpv BergMann, ~ ~1et~Ehysics .2! Logical 
Pos! tivism, New Yopk, 1954; iViorris Lazerow:1. tz, ~ structure of 
pIeto.EhIsic s. Nev! Y')rk, 1955. . 
2 A. J. Ayer, "On \-,'hflt There Is," PhilosophicGl 
Essays, NEH-l York, 1954, 215-230. 
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formally embraced 11 met~physic, they hqve tit least tempered 
their denun,cin tions of th'1t science f.!nd 9.re cautiously a,nd 
8lovJ1y weighing its vfllue qnd place. 
A third fnctor, tlnd q strong extrinsic impetus to 
positivists' second look at metophysics, is the amount of 
criticism pr~voked by the emoti.ve theory of values. This is the 
ethica.l theory of the posi ti vista and a logic';!,l outcome of his 
fundAmental tenet, the verific8.tion principle. For if' only 
those propositions Hhich c~n be verified by sense observp.,tion 
are meaningful, then stnter:1Emts implying the existence of moral 
standards, of the intrinsic worth of certAin WAyS of life 
and courses of action bacorne liter~lly non-sansicsl. Not that 
the positivist completely disreg~rds moral judgments; he looks 
upon such judgments simply as an expression of n speaker's 
f'eelines which, qS such, cannot be said to be either true or 
fa.lse. 
To illustrate this point, Professor Ayer makes use of 
several concrete examples. In the st~tement, "You acted wrongly 
in stealing tha.t money,ll the only fActUAl content, \"'rites Ayer. 
is that you stole th~t money.3 By CAlling this action "wrong" 
3 A. J. Ayer, Lgnguage, 'Ilruth and Logic, New York, 
1951, 107. 
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on6 is merely showing th'1t his st'1te:~]ent :;'s I1ccomp rmied by 
certain feelings of disapprovnl. Should one generRlize the 
original st.,tem~mt ;(l!1d s~.y, rtSte:!11ing 18 TI'lrong, II ~. sentence is 
produced \-1h1c{1 h"-l.s no f'actu"". r:18~ninE'1t ?ll.l~ COl1sccp .. vmtly, 
ther-:) is !lbso lcltely nothing therein "lhi ch cen be s~ici to be 
true or false. Using ['h'·; further eX':\rnple, "It 18 your dut;l to 
tell th~) tI'-:lth,!1 AyeI' m'gues thnt this can only be viewed as nn 
expr'ession of !:! pr:trtlcul'-',r kind of Mo'ral feeling about truth-
f'UL"'l9SS and/or the expression of the commnnd, fl'rell the truth. "5 
To ask ",hether telling the truth is right or wrong is just 
positing a Meaningless question. 
, 
Thus in concrete fashion we have the emotive theory 
of VAlues. It is a sJmple ma.tter now to generalize and 
ShOl-l the impossi bili ty of rinding Bny criterion to determine 
the vnlidity of ethical judgments, AyeI' does so ~.s follows: 
It is r;ot beca.use they (etl1icel judgments) hpve an 
"absolute!f Vq l::tli t;y t'lhich 1 s mystcri Qusly ind,;penuent 
of ordinary sense-experi<,:mce, but because tht;ly have no 
objective validity ('inatsos'lcr. If a scn-Cence makes no 
st"1tement at all, there is obviously no sense in asking 
t..rhethe:r' tvhat it S"lys is oi the:::' true 01~ false. And we 
have seen th~t sentences which simply express moral 
4 ill£. 
:> Ibid., 108. 
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jud(~rnent '"1 c~'o no·' sq '" l'lrl \-+l-'i l"\P' l'h""--~ n r'" nU'P6 "'xp""e saions b 1>.;;' \,,, • .j ·t.~~l ... ' ~~J. .~~~}. .... ........ y r.," \~ .t-' .', v .J,. - v 
of feeling Bnd as such do not come under the category of 
truth, or- f~lsehoodt 'rhey 8,re unverifi8ble for the same 
reason as a cry of pain or Ii l>lOrd of command is unverif;-
able--becflLlsA .hey do not cXt.<!:'BSS genuine J;roposi tions. 
Clrn'i ty Professop Ayer' nevr;r lA.cks. 
By tho r(l,Zor of verifiability, ethics Goes tho ~'lay of 
metaphysics. It is only logic,"!.}. thAt the tvo should shr.:re the 
~ame rejection. For if metaphysics is judged me~ningless 
bec8use it flllows t!'etls-empir'ic[ll rep Ii ties, ethics rous t receive 
the sF.l.me judcment. PreciselJ because va.lues are "Ji thout reality, 
morf1 Is, in t<ny real sense, Rre vi thout meB.ning. 'llhis CAn be the 
only conclusion fOl" t~le consistent positivist. In destroying 
metaphysics, he necessarily dest:r'oys ethics. For if' there is 
no InGfm:i.nE in things, at lenst none thAt philosophy cen discover, 
then it is irmlossible to a.ssign an end to humGn existence; if' 
the 1forld thr.t '{.16 know hy our senses is the only real" then 
questions concel'ning the natuI~e and destiny of man, simply 
cannot be discussed. Notions of God, imnlOJ'tali ty And freedom 
are motaphysica 1 Bud, the:l"cfore, mennin,gl<·; dB. 7 
The 10gic8.l results of the positivist destruction of 
ethics 8re only teo obvious. Fo:e as C.E.N. Joad writes: 
6 Ibid., 108-109. 
7 A. J. Ayer, Lf:lngua.ge, I.£ruth ~ Logic, New York, 
19;;1, 115-l1'{. A.. Pap, Element s of Analytic phllosoph:t;, New 
York, 1949, 325. -
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Sap the found"tions of 11 rntlonRl befief in God, in truth 
1n goodness and in beAuty, as LogiC'll Posi ti viam ca.nnot 
help but do, confi:-H) menningful asseI'tions Lo matters of 
empirical fact Bud you S01,-1 the seeds of intolertlnce Ar..d 
dOgmAtism, ~~ woeds spring u~ where a man c~ts down a 
healthy crop and puts nothing in i tG pIA,ce. b 
Indeed, if there is no objective rigbt and wrong, if rna I'll 1 
jUdgment's 8 re mere expl"essions of emotions, 1-111.y di sapf,rove of 
Nazi concentration camp practices, of Communist torture and 
brain-washing, why execute the llrurder'er, vlhy speak of the rignts 
and obliga.tions of labol:' and man9.gement, why uphold the ci vi 1 
liberties of negroes? Should someone controdict my condemnAtion 
of theft, obscene li tarA tura or narcotic pedciling, \rJe rea lly 
could have no argument. If both of us are merely expressing 
our moral sentiments, f1there is plainly no sense in asking 
'\-1hich one of us is right. b'or nei theI' of' us is asser·ting a 
genuine proposition.u9 All phases of' human r-tctivicy--from 
private and i'aroily li1'e, to the fields of business, educ"llticn, 
national and intornAtion~,l politlc8--must necessarily suffer 
the repercussions of the posi ti vist "science" of' etnics. 
The morql rel~tivism implicit in the emotive t~1.eory. 
however, is not somet,ling nevJ in the history of thought. From 
8 c.~. M. Joad, A Critique 2! Logical Positivism, 
Chicago, 1950, 1~2. 
9 A. J. Ayer, ~~~gu~ge, ~ruth ~ Logic, New York, 
1951, 108. 
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the time of Protilgoras it h.!lS been const"'ntl::i" reviewed ,qnd 
defended. WhRt 1s nOvT, fl.S John :1ild remarks, is Ittrw lntel-
lectual arrogance 't-Tith which thls time-worn point of view is 
dogmR.t1eslly asserted l.d th no !'n tional defense, exce;:~t for an 
l),ppe"l to the authority of modern sciance, and ~.dth no cAreful 
consideration of opposed position. D10 But the reaction to the 
rela.tl vism of posi t1 vists is not altogElther different froM thA 
opposition ProtlOl.gora.s a.nd tho Sophistsf?.ced in the persons of 
SocP!:J.tes and Plato. The la.tter two percel ved a connection be-
tvleen the crisis of Athens nnc'i' th" moral anarchy that the I'e-
lativistie theories of the Sophtsts brought on. This appears 
the prime reason for their philosophical pttempt to pI'ovide 
foundation fo~ object5ve goodness, justice, beauty, etc. 
In a similar crisis of the present age, positivists, 
lUre the Sophists before them, are being challenged. Modern 
• 
man finds himself' in 8. world alive tdth anxiety, brought on 
by tho shock of two world W!1rs and their aftermath and by the 
painful k..'>lowledge thnt the greR.t powers possess the a"reaome 
tools of genocide. The thregt of nothingness caused by 
the atomic bomb 1s the s'\>1ord of Damocles hanging over men today. 
10 John Wild, ~ Challenge ££ Existen~ial~~J 
Indiana, 1955, 24-. 
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and thoology~ :Moj'l:'l.l pl':i.:ncil·les, nlitc.Y'Al f'ln(; divIne, hp.ve come 
to he viewed, not rno~8ly RS Med1ev~1 superstitions, hut 
6s3ential tools in the ta9k of she~r survival. 
Indicrl tions of this rHnr attitude h.!lve come from many 
and vnried :,:\ources. We witness tho popula.rity of Bishop Sheen, 
of Niebuhr and Till,ich; we hOBr the B.ppl'oval of ~ ',! 1955 
Christmas issue on Chl"'jstiF.l.ni ty; v.Je rea.d Time's report on the 
--
revivAl of interest in religion on campuses across the United 
Stf3tes;11 we note President Nnthall Pusey of HA.rvnrd stf.lting 
th8t "it is almost ul1,iversally acknowledged that the atudyof 
religion Y'ightfully belongs (wi thin un! vers! tics), and this is 
so becnuse relicLm! s concerns J:Mke vl'l.lid claims upon all of 
us."12 
In contr'9st, in th,; decades up to l,,,rorld ~ll!1r II, it 
• 
..,;as science thl'lt hold the attention a.nd hopes of IDa.n. With 'the 
sciences, notably physios, pointing to so mRny achieveI'ltmts, 
it is not strangR that science bOCAmo mAnta goldeD calf. Today, 
the situation 5_s different. 'rho HOl"ld fl:lces e. crisis -vlhich is 
centered j.n the predicament of modern man "'lhose po't'ITer over 
575. 
11 uEdu(':"tion,tt~, November 21, 1955, 60-62. 
12 "Gurrent Comment,tt Americ9, February 25, 1956, 
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n!1ture thrs9tens to unleRsh demonic .forces he hHS not mastered 
in himself or his society. Morp,l restraint of this power will 
be the only suceessful mC:'lns of Hverting a 20th century 
ci!'ltaclysm. 'l'hinking men have thus been forced to re-evaluate the 
s('.opc or science e.nd are comir~g to the realIzation that science 
cannot provide for nIl man's needs and enS'krsr all his pr·oblems. 
\vhile useful And accurate in many areas, science can never pro-
vide 1"0r the spiri tual needs of man; it can nover' provide the 
morel restraint necessBry to prevent science itsel.f .from 
destroying its human creators. 
With man's hope ~md. trust in science alone dimin-
1shing, B. lack o.f genuine interest in the philosophy of positiv-
ism is bound to follow. As st~ted previously, positivism, with 
its appeal to science for justificqtion and for R standard of 
rationality, is little more than the handm:qiu of science. This 
• 
is necessarily the case, for the positivist claim is thRt all the 
data of experience bel<ng to the province of one of the restx'icted 
sciences. Thus there are no philosophical data. All thRt 
relnains fQr philosophy, Professo!' \!'Jild relT}9.rks, is Illogic and 
linguistic analysiS, a study of the tools used by sciance in 
making 1 ts empirical investigqtions and in 8tH ting iGB results.lI13 
13 Jo~m ~>iild, ~ ChRllonge _of' ~istentiHlism. 
lq r'r' 9 ~,?'), 411 
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A phil.osophy of ,his n:'>tUJ~(' c~.n nevey' nI·o-.rlde tho 
rcplizlng the necessi ty of fl. phi 1osophy t-Jhich offors n soJ5d 
some objective norm of mor~llity Hhie:, is immutable Bnd 
universnl, one thnt upholds ~~h,..,t certl1in nctions are 
intI'insicRlly evil, thnt a mnn Cl'umot 8.ct contrnry to hiD 
conscience, th0t tllA good 'ftll ~ 1. be re'l"j"lrded and the evil 
punish:-d in U_fe aft'3!' de~th.. But all thi~3 3upposes a metaphysic 
8.nJ SO positivism Cf-lnnot eV'3n hope to s8.tisf:r such dernr.lnds. 
Tl1.esc lAcunae in positivism help explfJ.in the f3Uccess of the 
nloclern exi stentlnlist movement. As KierkeJ:-gaard in h:1 s day 
rebellod neainst tho rcigninc HeGol1nn philosophy, so today 
cxlstcntilllism is chn.llcnging the prevBi ling posi ti vi st scheme 
for its innbility to me0t I;h9 problems qnd needs of the day. 
Posi ti vista themselves 8re not un~".rnre 01' serious 
deflcinncie:3 in theiJ:' e}:plnne.tlon of eth:I.c;:;;. vn.lues. In his 
most recent col1,ectio~1 of ess~ys, Professo-;:> Ayar aVO't-18 the 
emotive theory of values in its original f0rm to be l1,n over-
sir.tplification. 14 He qU81if5.es in illBny wAyB his pr0vious 
14 A. J. Ayer, I::bJ.losophical Essays, New York, 1954, 
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stntements and takes pains to d any thn.t mor:Jls al'a trivial or 
1.t.'l1.iroportA.nt,15 that nothinc j3 good or bad, 2'iE;ht or wrong,16 
and thrl.t anythin,.I that anybody thinks right is right.17 With 
regnrd to freedom o£ the will, £urt~Drm~re, Ayer will no longer 
a.ssex't that it is a mere illusion, for "to say trHlt ray behn.vior 
can be pfedicted is not to say that I am ~cti under· 
con.ot'''''~iY''· 18 _"' ....... J. .. \. ,J.,J..V. 
D1US, despite Slny not1)ble c 11€.0S in doctrine, as Ayer 
anci ot.her posicivists"Jr'ite on, Dne thins becc-~es appl·u·ent: the 
unqualified l~ositivism of a ~Jecad.e 9:~~O is no more. 
15 .ill..:!. , 2~-5 • 
16 ~., 246. 
17 Ibid ... "11 1""-, '-,-\-I • 
-
., n 
.l..'- Ibid ... ,~ "4 c.:CJ I • 
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CHAP'l'l:m VI 
SUNMAay AND i{E-EVALiJATION 
In this fin~.l eva.luation of logical positivism, we 
sh~ll first inoicate the main outlines of the arguments traced 
in the preceeding chapters. In this wny the present st,qtus of 
positivism will be brought into clearer focus and evalu8tion 
will be facilitated. 
In first place, let us reconsider the verification 
principle itself. In its simplest form this he.s been stqted 
in the follo\ving Wfiy: the meaning oi,' a st!1tement is the method 
of its verifiea tion. From Mor! tz Schlick a.nd Karl Popper 
through Alfred AyeI', we have seen the principle grow more and 
more complex in an effort to ~1Void difficulties impossible 
of solution. l Even in his most recent attempt at re-formuletion 
Professor AyeI' is faced with a sharply pronged dilemma: either 
• 
the verification criterion proves too inclusive, allowing 
tactual significance to any st8tement whatsoever, or too 
exclusive, denying meqning to hypothetical propositions and 
thus making nonsense of scientific theories. 2 Ayer has elected 
1 Cf. Chapters II and III. 
2 A. J. Ayar, Language, Truth ~ Logic, New York, 
1951. 11-13; Chapter III, 27-28. 
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the former course but other positivists have not gone along 
,,11th him.3 
Since th~ verificntion principle as 9. generA I 
criterion of roel=lning is the vf':ry core of positivism, this 
dlfficult;y is indeed an embarrassing one. If the verificA.tion 
principle itself cannot be formulptect with sufficient logical 
accuracy, it cannot begin to act as a method to settle perennial 
philosophical disputes ~nd positivism 1'R.11s in the task it has 
set for itself. 
JUstification of the verific~tion principle is a 
second important issue for positivists, and one that reveals 
the implicit premises on 1,-7hich positivism stand.s. Within the 
pos:ltivist context, either ~ Erior1. or empirical reasons might 
be offered in justification of the vc:rification principle. 
Neither, however. is possible since the ~ Eriori is a fr~e nnd 
arbitrary con8t~uction of the mind and since rueanin& is not 
'! 
even in principle capable of empirical observation. Professor 
Ayer would still defend the verificqtion principle though, 
because unless A stqtement satisfied that criterion of meaning, 
"it would not be c.qpable of being understood in the sense in 
which scientific or' common-sense stqtements are hAbitually 
3 Cf. Chapter III. 35-3'/~. 
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understood."4 But this only means it would not be a scientific 
or common-sense statement and does not establish the vorifica-
tion principle as a universal criterion of meRning. 
AyeI' has apJ)ealed to scientific uSA.g.e in another 
context. Because he claims thAt basic propositions like other 
factual propositions are hypothetical anci hence never certain, 
he is forced to find a criterion for the validity of factual 
propositions other than these basic propositions • .5 The 
criterion offered is whether or not a proposition fulfills the 
function it is designed to fulfill, that is, to antiCipate 
future experience. 6 Why is this a valid criterion? Ayer's 
answer is clear: because this criterion has been arrived at by 
the methods we now consider reliable and "we trust the methods 
of contemporAry science because they have been successful in 
practlce."7 
• 
Ayer r s two appeals to m;)dern science testify to the 
positivists' implicit faith in qn empirical view of the world. 
They bring to light thnt hidden and basically metaphysical 
4 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, New York, 19.51, 16. -
.5 Cf'. Chapter IV, 46-~J3 • 
6 A. J. Ayer, Language, 'fruth ~ Logic" New York, 
1951, 99. 
7 Ibld. , 100. 
-
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aspect of positivism, an empiricist metRphysics asserting 
that the only real is the sensible. Positivism's notable 
claim of destroying metaphysics, then, is accomplished only 
by a metaphysics. Thereby it destroys itself, rejecting as 
nonsense the philosophical premises on which its own con-
elusions depend. 
A third difficulty faCing positivists revolves about 
the question of basic propositions, those elemental building 
blocks of empirical knowledge. Are such propositions certain 
or not? Against Wittgenstein and other positivists holding 
for certitude, Professor Ayer has argued that one cannot 
in languA.ge point to any object wi thout in some way describing 
~1 
it.\.) In other words, for an intelligible proposition 
classificf.!.tion is always necessary. If this be the case, 
AyeI' realizes, then even basic propositions cannot be certain 
• 
since all CIRSS notions for positivists are but free constructs 
of the mind and, as such, beyond the data of experience. Thus 
basic propOSitions can provide neither justification nor 
certitude for positiVist conclusions ~nd the very foundations 
of empirical knowledge remain in doubt. 
B ~., 91. 
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A fourth and pressing difficulty facing positivists 
spr'ings from their ethicq 1 theory I the emotive theory of 
values, Since the verific~.tion cri tsrion admits as meaningful 
only those sentences which can be verified by sense observation, 
stqtements implying moral values cannot be said to be factually 
significant. For the positivist, such statements are merely 
expressions of one's feelings or emotions.9 By the razor of 
verifiability positivists destroy metaphysics; so in like 
manner must they destroy any genuine ethics. For if values 
are ',dthout reA.lity, morlls, in an~'f reAl sense, are without 
meaning, Such an ethical theot·y carmot adequately account for 
value-judgments and cannot provide the moral code necess~ry 
today. 
Thus four mAjor difficulties face positivists, 
difficulties which must be solved if positivism, as a philosophy 
• 
of the real, is to survive. By intrinsic examination and 
purely logical pnalysis,--eminently positivist methods--it 
appears that positivism fails to do what it purported to do, 
th"lt is, to i'orrnulqte with logical accura.cy a cri tarion of 
meaning and thereby ·to eliminRte metaphysics and solve 
perermia.l philosophical disputes, to offer some justif'ica.tion 
9 Ibid., 108. 
-
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of thi s cri tori on" to exp l~.in ba. si c proposi ti ons.. to '1 cc ount 
for v~luG-judgments. 
~fuether or not positivists can solve these dif-
ficulties by mere logic ~nd linguistic anA-lysis is R. question 
\>le should, like to ask a.t thi s point. With rega.rd to the first 
difficulty" one reAson why the v8rification criterion defies 
sa.tisfactory formulation would seem that it attempts too much. 
All transempirical stAtements of existential import, and 
specifically metaphysical stqtements, cannot be denied meaning 
because a.t least somo of thflrll are meaningful. The human spirit 
cannot dismiss all questions concerninG being, man or God 
. 
simply as meaningless. And in evidence th8t positivists may 
now recognize this, we have Professor Ayer saying, 
••• I do not overlook the fact that the 1tl0I'd "meaning" 
is commonly used in a variety of senses, and I do not 
wish to deny that in some of these senses a st8temen.t 
may properly be said to be meaningful even though it 
is neither antllytic nor empirically verifiable. 10 
Furthermore, as regnrds destroying metaphysics by one stroke 
of the verificqtion principle, Ayer now admits thllt ufor the 
effective eliminqtlon of metnphysics it (the verification 
principle) needs to be supported by detAiled Analysis of 
particulqr metpphysic:e:ll 8rguments."11 Neither he nor any other 
10 Ibid., 15. 
-
11 ~., 16. 
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logical positivist, hR.S given us any ei'fective detailed 
ana.lysis of this kind. 
In examining the positivist's problem over justifica-
tion of the verific8tion criterion, a similAr though implicit 
direction tow~rd metaphysics can be noted. In Ayer's double 
offer of scientific usage ~s justificRtion a covered, perhaps 
unconscious, a.ppeal is made to a metaphysics of empiricism. 
But ",n thout proof and sUbstantiation of this empirical world 
view, on the hJ~othesis that such is possible, positivist 
tenets can remain but arbitrAry and hypothetical. 
Should positivists explicitly uphold an empiricist 
.metaphysics, other difficulties \-JOula still remain. In 
consid.er-ing the question of basic propositions we noted that, 
1.Ji thin the posi ti viet frameworlGJ these elemental proposi tions 
can never be certain. This is but a logical result of the 
• 
positivist's notion of the class or universal as a pure oon-
8tl~ct of the mind with absolutely no foundation in experience. 
For if intelligible propOSitions demand classification ... -and 
here positiVists concur vlith Kant t. cogent R.nalysis- ... then 
in such propositions, basic or otherwise, all certitude 1s 
excluded and posi ti vism ap~)eBrS as a completely unverified 
philosophy. To settle this difficulty, R meta.physics of 
empiricism will not suffice. For, as Professor Ayer realizes, 
class notions for the empiricist are necessarily beyond the 
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data of exp!'}rience. 12 Only the recognition of a non-sensory 
elements of experience, the class or universal itself, oan 
provide An adequate solution. A solution of this n~.ture, 
however, would mean a denial of the empiricist doctrine of 
the given AS sense-data alone and of experience as sens~tion 
alone. In that event positivists would assuredly find them-
selves in the area of a broader and more acceptable meta.physics. 
Though a fundamental revision of this type is still in the 
realm of possibility. the problem at least ~nd the impossibility 
of an empiricist solution seems manifest to positivists. 
A second difficulty whickl positivists cannot handle 
by adopting an empiricist metaphysics centers about ethical 
matters. In the positivist scheme, we recall, all morql 
judgments are neoessarily but expressions of feeling completely 
devoid of faotual content.13 When men have come to the 
realization, however, thqt an objective and universal standard 
of morality is not merely a matter of icing-on-the-cake but an 
essential tool in the task of self-preservation--as have men 
in tIle atomic age--this relntivistio theory of positivists 
is far from adequate. A broa.der world-view, a metaphysics 
12 
13 
Ibid., 91. 
-
Ibid., 108. 
-
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that recognizes as meanineful questions About God, the soul, 
moral good or evil, is required to qnswer the needs and 
problems of men today. 
Professor Ayer is not umn-Jare of' serious deficiencies 
in positivist ethical doctrine. Recently he has explicity 
denied c1:;rtain implications of the emotive theory, namely 
that nothing is good or bad, right or wr·ong,14 R.nd th~t any-
thing that anybody thinks right 1s right.lS Although Ayer 
may sincerely entertain such Views, the question is whetller 
or not they can be substantiated within the positivist context. 
Wi th but an empi ricist metaphysics as backing the answer \\Tould 
be a decided~. Thus again it is evident th~t, while 
positiVists have avowed no formal metaphysics, they are forced at 
least to look in that general airection. 
Indeed, this last difficulty may well be the m~st 
serious faCing positiVists today. For from the history of 
thought it would seem thnt a philosophical movement is never 
really brought to a halt or radical change of course simply 
by the arguments and ref'ut"'tions of other prtilosophers. "'That 
vlould appea.r the primary factor in Flny such evont is ~ phil-
osophy's own inadequacy in meeting t.he problems and needs of 
the da.y. This serious fn.iling strikes the modern movement of 
14 A. J. Ayer, ~hilosophical gsSqys, New York, 1954,24 
1 
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positivism 1rlith most obvious force in its account of'moral 
values. It \;)'ill perhaps fall into disregard more rapidly on 
this aocount thtln by reason of e,ny detailed refutation. 
Let us s.rgue this point lurther. Post ti vism, we noted 
earlier, has restricted philosophy to mere logic and analysis.16 
tmat :1s needed. today, however, is a philosophy, a meta.physica.l 
scheme, ie/hieh C an offer an integral and coherent view of reality, 
not a vieltJ' of logical eppara tus. ~"i th his disregard of the 
real ana emphasis on logic the positivist is 1I1ike a man who 
becomes so interested in the cracks and spots of dust on his 
glasses thAt he losos all interest in what he may Bctu~lly see 
through them. n17 Today the metaphYSician, not the pure 
logiCian, will capture the interest of' men. 
Thus in reViewing possible solutions to the tour 
Inajor difficulties faCing positivists, we finG satisfacto.ry 
answers all pointing in one direction, and thlJt in the direction 
at metaphysics. Formulation and justii'ication of the verifica-
tion principle demands a metaphysics, albeit a met,qphysic of 
empiricism; the question of basic propositions and value 
16 Ot. Cha.pter I, 10; Chapter V, 59. 
17 John \,vild, ~ Challenge 2f.. Existentialism, 
Indiana, 1955, 10. 
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judgments require J1 met~physic of' wider scope. Not that 
metaphysical arguments in themselves have convinced positivists 
that certain doctrinql ch~nges J1re necessary. After all, such 
arguments are meaningless in thoip eyes. RAther', the poiI),t of 
this an~lysis Has to show that positivism has failed in its 
initiRl purpose, 1ncapable, as it is, or solving the 
difriculties outlined above. This fqtal weakness is only too 
apparent to positivists themselves. Reoognition of ttis 
weakness seems to have cleared the air behind positivists' 
closed doors, forcing them to take R second ~:md clearer look 
at this mqtter of meta.physics. 
Indic·~tions of growing interest and thought in 
posi ti viet circles concerning "first philosophy" have alreB.dy 
been mentioned throughout this ana.lysis. Among Y'6cent ~igns 
of the same trend we note the publication of Gusta.v Bergmann's 
~ MetAphysics .2£. Logicll!. Positivism and !1orris Lazerowi tz 's 
~ Structure .2!. r<IJ.e,tal?h~sics--strange tl tIes indeed from the 
positivist's pen. 18 l1h11e holding that metaphysical stRtements 
are neither ~ priori nor empirieal, Lazerowitz does not consider 
them non-sensicrtl. He terms them linguistic innov9.tions to 
sa.tisfy soml) unconscious neer;i or desire, Alfred Ayar, we 
., 
18 Gustav Bergman, The MetaEhxsics of' Logical 
Positivism, New York, 1954; MorrIs Lazerowltz,"""The Struotur·e 
~t Meta.Ehysic~, New York, 1955. ---
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have seen, has given evidence of the same concern. In his 
recent collection of essl1Ys, f'urthermoI'e, he seems aware of 
'the unique chqracter of existential propositions, a character 
which prevents purely verbal analysis and which indicates that 
such propositions can be handled only by f-\ science dealing 
with the real as such.19 'fuus it vould seem a legitimate 
oonclusion that, while positivists have not formally a.dopted 
a metaphysics, they ao1"e at least making serious ",nd obvious 
advances in thqt direction. 
Prom even a cursory glance at !'ecent posl ti vi st 
writings, it is clear that the unqualified and self-satisfied 
positivism of p, decade ago is no more. 'llhere FJro still some 
uncompromising representatives of the original roovement left 
in the :Cield, brillinnt and industrious. men like Garnap, Hempel 
and 1<'rank, but among the younger generntion thero are ha:ordly 
• 
any whoo would carryon the "apostolic mi~:;siontt of the Vienna. 
Circle. It appears noy! that the original arrogance and svleep-
ing c l~J.ims of posi ti vi sta sprang, not i'rOIll any intrinsic 
strength of doctrine clearly recognized as such, but rather 
from a desire to make an initial And striking impact in 
philosophical eiI'cles, Positivists ot the younger generation, 
however, perceive weak points in the positivist structure 
19 A. J. Ayer, "On ~mat (rhers Is." Ph11osoI?hicRl 
ESS9YS. New York, 1954, 215-230. 
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and, consequently, hflve tempered their denunciations tjf 
contr~ry opinions and qU9lified many tenets of the enrly 
positivist school. 
Befo:.'·e concluding, it is only fitting thpt we give 
posit;iv~sm its due. 'vlith its emphasis on mere logic flnd 
linguistic nnalysls, positivism has caused considerable havoc 
in th~ philosophic;:!.l enterprlse. 20 :But there is also a 
~ positive side. Positivist insistence on acourate, 01e9.1' and 
precise stf"'. taments has cel'tainlJr shmm mAny a philosophical 
proposi tion to be truly nlAaningless e.n(.; has forced all 
philosophers to avoid runbigui ty Rnd logioal inacouraoy in 
putting i'ol"'tb their opinions. Indeed, p:n~.ctically everyone 
tod'1.y recognizes the value 01' fornm.l logic for philosophy. 
l.rhus post tivists :.1ave lost theil' initial monopoly in these 
fields; what t.{as worthwhile in their system be01=H!'le common 
• 
good. 
To summnrize this final analys!s,i:;hen, i~e he.ve seen 
thn.t fou~ T'lA jo~ difficulties f8ce posl :;i vista: . f'ornrulo tion 
and justlfic p tion of the verification prinoiple, the question 
of bas1c propositions ~nd of vBlue-judgments. In view of 
positiv1sts' 1ml.bi11ty to solve these difficulties by purely 
20 Cf. Chapter I, 1J; ChApter V, S9 • 
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10g1c~1 means they have been forced to rethink the ~vhole 
matter of metaphysics. At pr~sent they no longer dismiss 
metaphysics at ~ stroke of thA verificl:!tion princiY.)le; they 
would seem to view it now, not as meanIngless, but as non-
sclenti1'ic--which is to say that it is not of the nature of 
contemporary sclence.2l This I!lnd oth~r indlc n tions) finally, 
lead to the conclusion that positivists,' albai t slowly and 
cautiously, are approaching the area of a.n acceptable meta-
physics. 
21 A. J. Ayer, Languase, Truth ~ Logi~, New York, 
• 
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